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CIVIL RIGHTS CONUNDRUM 
Carl Tobias* 
PROLOGUE: ROBESON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 
The Native Americans and African Americans comprising nearly 
two-thirds of the residents in Robeson County, North Carolina 
have experienced racism for all of their lives. 1 Interstate 95, a ma-
jor route for drug traffickers, intersects this poor rural county. Ac-
cording to court documents, many residents believe that some local 
law enforcement officials participate in the substantial drug trade 
there.2 
William Webb, a former Assistant United States Attorney, re-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Hesse, Sally Johnson, 
and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Beverly Stevenson for 
processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Any errors that 
remain are mine. 
1 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Lewis Pitts at 2, In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 
505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991) (No. 90-807) [hereinafter Pitts 
Petition]. 
2 See Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 2-3 (discussing "general climate of fear" among 
Robeson residents due to drug trafficking and noting law enforcement officials' involvement 
in drug trade). 
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cently led a joint investigation by the United States Attorney for 
the Eastern District of North Carolina and the North Carolina 
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) into cocaine trafficking in east-
ern North Carolina.3 In February 1987, Mr. Webb informed the 
Raleigh News and Observer that Robeson County was "one of the 
largest areas for cocaine sales I've seen."4 One year later, Webb 
told the Raleigh newspaper that there had been no change: "It's 
true-Robeson County is awash in cocafo.e."5 
On February 1, 1988, Eddie Hatcher and Timothy Jacobs, two 
members of the Tuscarora Tribe, staged an armed takeover in the 
offices of The Robesonian, a newspaper published in Robeson 
County.6 Hatcher and Jacobs held twenty hostages for ten hours, 
in order, they said, to protest and to publicize their previously ig-
nored charges of widespread corruption and criminal conduct in 
local government. This alleged government wrongdoing particu-
larly threatened the well-being of Native Americans and African 
Americans living in Robeson County, because their lack of eco-
nomic resources and of political power makes them especially vul-
nerable to the improper exercise of governmental authority.7 
The two men later specifically asserted that they intended the 
takeover to serve as a forum for charging Robeson County Sheriff 
Hubert Stone and the local District Attorney with corruption and 
official misbehavior.8 Hatcher and Jacobs said that they also acted 
out of concern for their personal safety and that of a Native Amer-
ican inmate in the county jail who had given them information 
that implicated the Sheriff's Department in activities involving il-
3 See Memorandum of Appellant Barry Nakell Responding More Completely to Ques· 
tions at Oral Argument at 4 n.3, In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2815), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991) [hereinafter Memorandum of Nakell]. 
• Lee Freeland Hancock, Cocaine Trade Rich in Robeson, Officials Say, RALEIGH NEWS 
AND OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 1987, at lA, 9A. 
• Joe Dew & Jane Ruffin, Drug Money a Powerful Lure in Robeson, RALEIGH NEWS AND 
OBSERVER, Feb. 14, 1988, at lA. 
• In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of William Kunstler at 1, Kunst/er (No. 90-802) 
[hereinafter Kunstler Petition]; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3, 7. 
7 Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 510; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-5; Memorandum of Nakell, 
supra note 3, at 3-5 & n.3; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 9-10 (providing examples 
of improper governmental behavior toward these minorities). 
8 Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 510; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-4; Kunstler Petition, supra 
note 6, at 1; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Barry Nakell at 1, Kunst/er (No. 
90-1094) [hereinafter Nakell Petition]. 
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licit drugs.9 Hatcher and Jacobs explained that they sought to en-
courage North Carolina Governor James Martin to investigate 
these alleged improprieties, including the Sheriff's possible partici-
pation in the illegal drug trade and his responsibility for the death 
of an African American inmate who had died in the county jail 
while in the Sheriff's custody.10 
The episode ended peacefully when the two men "surrendered to 
federal authorities in exchange for a promise that a Governor's 
Task Force would investigate their complaints" about the offices of 
the District Attorney and the Sheriff and the SBI local and district 
offices.11 Crucial to the hostage negotiations was the opportunity 
that Hatcher and Jacobs had to surrender to federal, not state or 
county, officers because the two men feared the county officials 
who had been the focus of their charges.12 Hatcher and Jacobs be-
lieved that there was an agreement between the Governor, the 
North Carolina Attorney General, the United States Attorney, and 
the Sheriff that federal, rather than state, authorities would prose-
cute the two men.13 
The armed takeover of the newspaper office in February 1988 
triggered many developments, which have not yet run their course. 
This brief description of that event, however, narrates this story 
nearer its conclusion than its beginning. The tale actually has its 
origins in developments that began in the mid-1970s. Those devel-
opments led to changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 pre-
scribing the imposition of sanctions against litigants and lawyers 
who fail to conduct reasonable legal and factual inquiries before 
• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-5; Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 5. 
10 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-4; Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 4 n.3; 
Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 1. 
11 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 510-11; Consolidated Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writs of 
Certiorari on Behalf of William Kunstler, Barry Nakell and Lewis Pitts at 3, Kunstler 
[hereinafter Consolidated Brief]; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3; Kunstler Petition, supra 
note 6, at 1; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 1. 
12 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 1-2; Memorandum 
of Nakell, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
13 Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; see also Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 6-7 
(noting petitioners' conclusion that prosecution was brought in "bad faith"). But see Con-
solidated Brief, supra note 11, at 3 (noting federal prosecutor's lack of knowledge about "no 
state prosecution" agreement). The Governor arranged for federal, rather than state, prose· 
cution, but he did not coordinate that arrangement with the Attorney General or the United 
States Attorney. Letter from Barry Nakell, counsel for plaintiff Hatcher, to Carl Tobias 
(June 18, 1992) (on file with author). 
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filing suit or who pursue litigation for improper purposes.14 
Hatcher and Jacobs, and especially their attorneys, became very 
familiar with the 1983 amendment of Rule 11. 
I. THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION AND AMENDMENT OF RULE 11 
A. THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 
In the mid-1970s, the federal judiciary, led by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger, began to perceive that there was a litigation explo-
sion in the federal courts. 16 Many judges and commentators 
claimed that the number of federal civil lawsuits was increasing 
substantially and that too many of these cases were meritless.16 
Some observers argued that specific kinds of litigation, particularly 
civil rights cases, contributed significantly to expanding caseloads 
and that a disproportionate number of the lawsuits lacked valid-
ity.17 Numerous judges and writers criticized the 1938 Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which permitted flexible pleading and 
open-ended discovery while according litigants and attorneys sub-
stantial control over cases.18 Some of these judges and commenta-
tors contended that the Rules allowed parties and lawyers to abuse 
,. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text (discussing background and content of 
Rule 11 amendment). 
'" See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 740-41 (1975) (discussing concerns over potential for vexatious litigation); Warren E. 
Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need For Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND CON· 
FERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler 
eds., 1979) (discussing litigation explosion). 
18 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (expressing concern over 
"heavy litigation burden" of civil suits on federal courts); Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload 
Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 160 (1987) (concluding that civil filings in 
federal courts doubled between 1976 and 1986). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982) (describing trend toward greater judicial involvement in 
pretrial aspects of cases to expedite increased caseload). 
17 See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing 
Negrich v. Hahn, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967), for proposition that civil rights cases are 
disproportionately frivolous). But see id. at 927 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (stating that civil 
rights cases are not disproportionately frivolous); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, 
The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-43 (1987) (find-
ing that image of litigation explosion in civil rights area is overstated). 
18 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986) (chronicling problems caused by open-en· 
ded pleading under 1938 Federal Rules); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dino· 
saur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1984) (arguing that burden of litigation on 
courts is caused by inefficient pretrial procedures). 
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the process of litigation by using procedural devices for tactical 
benefit. For instance, litigants and lawyers allegedly employed the 
threat of protracted discovery or litigation to extract settlements 
from their opponents. 
B. AMENDED RULE 11 
Many of these ideas were controversial during the mid-1970s, 
and a number remain so today.19 It is nearly impossible, for exam-
ple, to define, much less to quantify, litigation abuse. Judges and 
writers encounter similar difficulties identifying what would consti-
tute a litigation explosion and ascertaining whether courts actually 
have experienced such a phenomenon. Despite these problems and 
a dearth of relevant data, the Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules and the Supreme Court considered and then proposed major 
changes in Federal Rules 11, 16, and 26 during the early 1980s.20 
Because Congress did not oppose the Court's recommendations, 
the revised provisions became effective in August 1983.21 
The drafters of the amendments intended to transform the na-
ture of federal civil lawsuits. 22 The revisions assigned litigants and 
1
• See Tobias, supra note 15, at 288-89 {citing pertinent literature and discussing efforts 
to resolve some of controversy); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. 
L. REv. 485, 522-23 (1988·89) {same). Compare Miller, supra note 18 (presenting case for 
existence of litigation explosion) with Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, 
the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921 {chnllenging idea that 
there has been litigation explosion). 
20 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Ex· 
ample of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1927-28 (1989) {noting Advisory Committee's lack 
of data concerning application of Rule 11); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2198-202 (1989) (same). 
The Advisory Committee is comprised of judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys. 
Congress has charged the Committee with responsibility for studying the Rules and devel-
oping proposals for change as indicated. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071-2074 (West. 1982 & Supp. 
1991}. See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and 
its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 l\1Ica L. REv. 1507, 1509-11 (1987) (surveying distri-
bution of responsibility for rulemaking shared between Congress and Supreme Court). 
21 See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983) 
(amending, inter alia, Federal Rules 11, 16, and 26). See generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE 
1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE 
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPoNsmILITY {Federal Judicial Center 1984) (discussing back-
groilnd and objectives of amendments). 
22 See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st 
Cir. 1988) {discussing effects drafters intended 1983 amendments to have on pretrial phase 
of litigation); MILLER, supra note 21, at 9-10 {discussing "themes," or goals, of various 
amendments}; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.BA J. 
906 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:901 
attorneys important, novel responsibilities, requiring, for instance, 
that they conduct reasonable inquiries before filing pleadings or 
certain discovery requests. The changes also enhanced trial courts' 
discretion and their control over litigation, especially during its 
pretrial phase, allowing judges, for example, to set the pace of dis-
covery. Amended Rule 11 required judges to sanction parties or 
lawyers who do not perform reasonable inquiries before they sub-
mit papers or who tender them for improper purposes.23 
C. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE AMENDED RULE 
From the time that revised Rule 11 became effective in August 
1983 until 1988, the federal judiciary applied the Rule's provisions 
in ways that disadvantaged many civil rights plaintiffs and their 
attorneys. 24 Rule 11 sanctions were sought from, and granted 
against, these plaintiffs more frequently than any other type of 
federal civil litigant.26 Many courts vigorously enforced the Rule's 
prefiling inquiry requirements against civil rights plaintiffs,26 and 
1648, 1650-52 (1981) (criticizing proposal that became 1983 amendment as substantial de· 
parture from original Rules). 
•• Rule 11 provides in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer 
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best 
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in· 
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose . . . . If a pleading, motion, 
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre· 
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to 
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses in· 
curred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
•• Carl Tobias, Reassessing Rule 11 and Civil Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161, 163 (1990); 
Tobias, supra note 19, at 490-507; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 
F.R.D. 189 (1988); cf. Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: 
A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1052-61 (1989) (providing 
positive view of Rule ll's efficacy). 
•• See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling" 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 
1340 (1986) (noting disproportionate number of civil rights cases in which Rule 11 sanctions 
are applied); Vairo, supra note 24, at 200-01 (same). 
•• See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080-85 (7th Cir. 
1987) (remanding case for more "serious" inquiry into Rule 11 violations), cert. dismissed, 
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some judges imposed onerous sanctions on plaintiffs who contra-
vened the provision.27 A significant number of courts inconsistently 
applied Rule 11 to similar factual circumstances or inconsistently 
interpreted the provision's phraseology, and there was much ex-
pensive satellite litigation principally involving the Rule's mean-
ing. 28 This implementation disadvantaged, and perhaps dispropor-
tionately affected, civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel. Many 
civil rights litigants and practitioners have limited resources, a 
consideration that can make them risk-averse.20 These develop-
ments discouraged the parties and attorneys.30 
In early 1988, around the time when Eddie Hatcher and 
Timothy Jacobs occupied The Robesonian newspaper offices, for-
485 U.S. 901 (1988); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(upholding imposition of sanctions for inadequate prefiling inquiry although important facts 
apparently were available to plaintiff only upon discovery). 
27 See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (imposing more than $1 
million in sanctions), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 
(1992); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1384-93 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (imposing $84,000 sanc-
tion), vacated in part on reconsideration, 123 F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988), affd in part and 
rev'd in part sub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). 
28 See, e.g., Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting 
division among courts and writers over whether Rule 11 imposes "continuing duty" on at-
torneys); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.) (showing dis-
trict and circuit judges retained three different views of appropriate amount of sanctions 
even after issuing five opinions), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see Burbank, supra note 
20, at 1930 ("[T]here is a conflict between or among circuits on practically every important 
question of interpretation or policy under the Rule •••• "); Tobias, supra note 19, at 514 
(recognizing problem of satellite litigation, litigation unrelated to merits of dispute). 
•• See Tobias, supra note 19, at 495-98 (describing heightened risk of sanctions placed on 
civil rights practitioners and litigants and noting that lack of resources makes it difficult to 
overcome intrinsic problems in meeting Rule 11 requirements). See generally Barry Boyer 
& Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Ci ti· 
zen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 923-35 (1985) (discuss-
ing litigation costs and incentives in citizen suits for environmental regulation and resource 
deficiencies of plaintiffs); John L. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Im· 
plications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Deriva· 
tive Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986) (discussing costs and incentives to litigate in class 
and derivative actions). 
30 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 503-06 (noting evidence of "chilling effects" of Rule 11 on 
civil rights litigation); Tobias, supra note 24, at 169-70 (same). These contentions are, how-
ever, controversial. See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments] 
(seeking opinions of members of bar to discuss possible "chilling ell'ect" of sanctions because 
controversial). 
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mal judicial application of Rule 11 in civil rights cases began to 
improve.31 A substantial number of appellate and district court 
judges enforced the provision in ways that were more responsive to 
the needs of civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. 32 
The national developments between August 1983 and early 1988 
were similar to those in the Fourth Circuit, although that appellate 
court evinced greater concern for civil rights plaintiffs in enunciat-
ing a Rule 11 jurisprudence. The Fourth Circuit issued considera-
bly fewer Rule 11 opinions than other appellate courts, such as the 
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.33 Those circuits are responsi-
ble for reviewing appeals from district courts that have exper-
ienced intensive Rule 11 activity, such as the Southern District of 
New York, the Northern District of Illinois, and the Northern Dis-
trict of California. 34 By contrast, no judges who are members of the 
Fourth Circuit showed the type of enthusiasm for the Rule exhib-
ited by several Seventh Circuit judges, who proclaimed their inten-
tion to enforce Rule 11 to the hilt. 35 • 
The Fourth Circuit expressed particular concern about the im-
position of large sanctions. For example, in one civil rights case, a 
panel of the court held that parties who win Rule 11 motions are 
31 See Tobias, supra note 24, at 166-71 (discussing judicial application of Rule 11 since 
mid-1988); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 
110-22 (1991) (discussing improvements in judicial use of Rule 11). 
32 See, e.g., Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing imposition of sanctions 
and recognizing chilling effect on civil rights cases); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 
866 (5th Cir. 1988) (providing guidelines for imposing Rule 11 sanctions and recognizing 
possibility of chilling effect); see infra notes 122-140 and accompanying text (discussing ju-
dicial development of Rule 11 application between 1988 and 1990). See generally Tobias, 
supra note 24, at 166-71; Tobias supra note 31, at 110-22 (noting recent judicial concern 
about imposing sanctions in civil rights cases). 
•• A LEXIS search revealed that the Fourth Circuit issued approximately 30 Rule 11 
opinions between August 1983 and December 31, 1987. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit is-
sued as many as 70 opinions in one year during that period. 
•• See Vairo, supra note 24, at 200 (stating that between August 1983 and December 15, 
1987, nearly one-third of reported cases arose out of districts including New York City and 
Chicago); Nelken, supra note 25, at 1326-28 (stating that "one-half of the Rule 11 opinions 
in the first two years came from [New York and Chicago]"); cf. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., 
FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES § lD, at 1-2 (1991) [hereinafter FJC REPORT] (noting that between 1984 and 
1989, district courts in Northern District of Illinois and Southern District of New York is-
sued 38% of reported opinions). 
•• Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. 
No. 8, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 
1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). 
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not "automatically entitled" to attorney's fees and that trial judges 
should choose the "least severe" sanction that serves the Rule's 
purpose.36 Another Fourth Circuit panel observed that in the Rule 
11 context reasonable attorney's fees need not be those actually 
incurred. 37 Few district judges in the Fourth Circuit applied the 
provision's reasonable prefiling inquiry requirement vigorously 
against civil rights plaintiffs. This Rule 11 jurisprudence, especially 
the relative infrequency with which sanctions motions are filed, 
may reflect the gentility prevalent in the region and in the local 
legal culture. 38 
II. ROBESON COUNTY REVISITED 
A. FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
Soon after Hatcher and Jacobs surrendered on February 1, 1988, 
the federal grand jury for the Eastern District of North Carolina 
returned indictments, which included weapons and hostage-taking 
charges, against the two men.39 The Robeson County District At-
torney, Joe Freeman Britt, then dismissed state kidnapping 
charges against Hatcher and Jacobs, apparently because the fed-
eral authorities had preempted those charges;'0 
In September 1988, the three-week criminal trial of Hatcher and 
Jacobs in federal court began. On October 14, 1988, a federal jury 
acquitted the two men of all federal criminal charges involving the 
takeover.41 The defendants claimed that their need for self-protec-
tion and for a forum in which to expose corruption in local govern-
ment justified the takeover. William Kunstler, a nationally recog-
u Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987). The panel did, however, find that 
there was a Rule 11 violation, admonishing the district judge to impose a sanction that 
would "serve the essential goal of education and deterrence underlying Rule 11." Id. at 467. 
37 Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 1988). 
"" For instance, judges of the Fourth Circuit always shake the hands of lawyers at the 
conclusion of oral argument. The absence of any large cities, such as New York, where there 
typically is more litigation abuse and members of the bar are relatively unlikely to know one 
another, may afford a partial explanation for the Rule 11 jurisprudence. See generally Law-
rence C. Marshall, et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REY. 943 (1992) 
(discussing federal court legal culture); Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 
33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1992) (same). 
. •• In re Kunstler,·914 F.2d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); 
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4. 
•• Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2. 
41 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4. 
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nized civil rights advocate, and Barry Nakell, a professor at the 
University of North Carolina School of Law, represented 
Hatcher.42 Jacobs's attorney was Lewis Pitts, Director of the Chris-
tie Institute South, a public interest law firm in Carrboro, North 
Carolina.43 Hatcher and Jacobs presented a joint defense, although 
the lawyers represented them separately.44 
The Charlotte Observer published an editorial following the ac-
quittal that stated: 
Obviously the allegations that Mr. Hatcher and Mr. Ja-
cobs made about conditions in their county were not only 
credible, but persuasive enough to convince the jury that 
they acted without criminal intent . . . . And jurors 
reached that conclusion without some of the most dam-
aging testimony about the criminal justice system [by] 
Maurice Geiger, a lawyer and co-director of the Rural 
Justice Center . . . . He said there were pervasive local 
assertions that law enforcement officers are involved in 
drug dealing . . . . There are simply too many rumors 
and assertions of corruption and injustice there for state 
and federal officials to ignore. 46 
B. ROBESON COUNTY AFTER ACQUITTAL 
Eddie Hatcher returned to Robeson County after his acquittal 
and, according to court papers, participated actively in political ef-
forts to prevent discrimination against Native Americans and Afri-
can Americans, to expose the alleged official misconduct in the 
county, and to promote constructive change.46 Hatcher and the 
Robeson Defense Committee, an organization formed to protect 
and promote the interests of Native Americans and African Ameri-
cans, sponsored public meetings and began a campaign to remove 
from office both Sheriff Hubert Stone and his son, Deputy Sheriff 
•• Id. 
•• Id.; Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
0 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4. 
•• Verdict Indicts Robeson-Shocking Decision Challenges Gov. Martin, Other Officials, 
CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Oct. 17, 1988, at Al7, reprinted in Memorandum of Nakell, supra 
note 3, at 4-5 n.3. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4-5; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; accord Con-
solidated Brief, supra note 11, at 4. 
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Kevin Stone.47 
The petition drive to oust the Sheriff initially enjoyed considera-
ble success.48 According to some sources, certain officials of the 
SBI, the Sheriff's office, and the District Attorney's office began to 
speak publicly and behave in ways that interfered with the cam-
paign, intimidated its potential supporters, and suppressed oppos-
ing political discussion.49 In November 1988, newspaper accounts 
reported that the SBI and the District Attorney had revived and 
broadened their investigation into the takeover. This new investi-
gation included possible conspiracy charges against persons other 
than Hatcher and Jacobs who may have been involved.110 SBI 
agents questioned Native Americans, African Americans, and 
others connected with the Robeson Defense Committee about their 
political activities and those of attorney Bob Warren and sought 
membership lists for the Tuscarora Tribe.111 The Sheriff's Depart-
ment allegedly pressured public school officials to prevent the 
Committee from using educational facilities for meetings.112 
Hatcher and other citizens of the county informed Lewis Pitts 
and Barry Nakell that these activities were intimidating residents. 
The two laWYers claimed that they sought confirmation of the ac-
counts in conversations with Robeson County public school offi-
cials, a tribal chief, and a security officer at a local state college.113 
In November and December, Nakell wrote two letters to the North 
Carolina Attorney General detailing the behavior of the SBI, the 
District Attorney, and the Sheriff, asking the Attorney General to 
" Pitts Petition, supra note l, at 5; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; Nakell Petition, 
supra note 8, at 1-2. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 5. 
•• In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); 
Pitts Petition, supra note l, at 5-6; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; Nakell Petition, 
supra note 8, at 1-3. 
60 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 6; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; accord Consoli-
dated Brief, supra note 11, at 5. "In fact, this 'investigation' appeared to be a sham as the 
possibility of conspiracy had already been thoroughly investigated and discarded as part of 
the Federal prosecution." Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 6-7. Warren was co-counsel with 
Lewis Pitts in the federal trial. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 7; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 7. This exclusion was contrary to school policy. Id. But 
see Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 6 (mentioning nothing about exclusion but ex-
plaining that sheriff's department was not responsible for providing security for meetings at 
school). 
, 
03 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 7-8. 
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investigate and respond. 54 The Attorney General rejected these re-
quests and claimed that the SBI was not participating in any 
abuse of process. 55 
C. STATE PROSECUTION 
After the North Carolina Attorney General rejected Nakell's re-
quests, the District Attorney for Robeson County announced that 
he intended to call a grand jury to bring the previously suspended 
state charges against Hatcher and Jacobs.116 Their lawyers, Nakell 
and Pitts, informed the District Attorney and the Governor's coun-
sel that state prosecution would contravene the agreement, reached 
in ending the takeover, which provided only for federal criminal 
prosecution.57 Nonetheless, on December 6, 1988, a Robeson 
County grand jury returned indictments against Hatcher and Ja-
cobs for kidnapping. 58 Local authorities arrested Hatcher and re-
leased him on bond. Hatcher then fled to California, where state 
authorities held him in custody pending extradition. Jacobs was 
arrested in New York and unsuccessfully opposed extradition.119 
Later in December, agents of the SBI and of the District Attor-
ney allegedly approached Jacobs's family without notifying Lewis 
Pitts, his attorney.6° Court papers state that the agents suggested 
that Jacobs dismiss Pitts as his lawyer, "return voluntarily to 
Robeson County, testify against Hatcher, and implicate others" in-
volved in the alleged conspiracy to take over The Robesonian. 61 
This interference troubled Jacobs, who was only twenty years old 
at the time, and disrupted his relationship with counsel and the 
joint defense with Hatcher.62 
Before and after the indictment, Pitts and Nakell claim that 
they made numerous attempts to convince the Attorney General 
•• Id. at 8; accord In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 1607 (1991); Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 3-5. 
•• Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2. 
•• Id.; see also Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 5. 
•
1 Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; see also Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 4-5. 
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 9; Kunstler Petition, supra 
note 6, at 2; accord Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 6. ' 
•• Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 5; accord Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, 
supra note 1, at 9. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 9-10; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 10. 
••Id. 
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that the SBI and the District Attorney were intimidating residents 
of the county, thus restricting their exercise of First Amendment 
rights.63 These persistent efforts proved unsuccessful, and a Dep-
uty Attorney General informed Nakell in December to expect no 
additional help from that office, because the Director of the SBI 
had "closed the door. "64 
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE 
A. FILING AND PURSUIT 
Nakell and Pitts concluded that they should seek injunctive re-
lief to protect the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel of Hatcher 
and Jacobs and the First Amendment rights of the two men and of 
other Robeson County residents.611 In January 1989, the attorneys 
researched relevant legal issues and conducted an additional fac-
tual investigation. They then circulated draft papers to numerous 
laWYers, including one who had expertise in litigation involving 
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, for their ad-
vice. 66 Nakell and Pitts briefly refrained from bringing suit, how-
ever, in an attempt to explore Jacobs's opportunities for a 
favorable plea bargain. 67 
On January 31, 1989, the eve of the first anniversary of The 
Robesonian takeover, however, Nakell filed the civil rights com-
-plaint in the Eastern District of North Carolina, and Pitts held a 
press conference announcing the litigation.68 Nakell, Kunstler, and 
Pitts filed an amended complaint on March 16, 1989.69 The plain-
tiffs were Hatcher, Jacobs, the Robeson Defense Committee, and 
several Native-American and African-American residents of Robe-
63 Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; accord Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Nakell Petition, 
supra note 8, at 4-6; see also supra text accompanying note 54 (describing attorneys' 
efforts). 
"' Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 11; accord Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 4-6. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12; accord Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Nakell Petition, 
supra note 8, at 6-7. 
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 7. 
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
•• "The Court of Appeals opinion erroneously said that Petitioner Nakell held the press 
conference." Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 8 n.5. The district court had not attributed to 
Nakell any comments to the press. Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 654-55 
(E.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 5-05 
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). Contra Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511. 
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12. 
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son County who were actively involved in the Committee.70 The 
defendants included the Governor, the Robeson County District 
Attorney and Sheriff, various members of their staffs, and numer-
ous John Doe defendants.71 
The complaint, filed pursuant to section 1983, alleged that the 
defendants had violated the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments by participating in a campaign of intimidation and 
harassment to suppress political dissent.72 Plaintiffs sought to en-
join interference with the relationship between Jacobs and his at-
torney, harassment of participants in the campaign to remove the 
Sheriff, and the state prosecution of Hatcher and Jacobs, including 
the extradition of Jacobs.73 
The plaintiffs immediately moved for expedited discovery; how-
ever, the district judge stayed all discovery when the State re-
quested a protective order alleging that the plaintiffs improperly 
sought this information to use in the pending criminal proceed-
ing.74 Plaintiffs submitted papers in opposition to the State's mo-
tion, but the trial court had not yet ruled on discovery when it 
granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the case.711 
B. DISMISSAL 
Many developments led Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts to recon-
sider their pursuit of the civil rights case.76 The attorneys said they 
believed that the government's approaches to Jacobs through his 
family undermined the relationship between Jacobs and Pitts and 
between the two defendants.77 Jacobs, having unsuccessfully op-
posed extradition, decided to return to Robeson County in late 
1° Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12-13. Pitts represented Jn· 
cobs and his mother; Kunstler and Nakell represented the remaining plaintiffs. Pitts Peti· 
tion, supra note 1, at 13. 
11 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 13. The plaintiffs sued the 
Governor in his official capacity and all other defendants in their official and individual 
capacities. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511. 
72 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 3. 
73 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14. 
1
• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511-12; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 3; Pitts Petition, 
supra note 1, at 14. The stay stalled the case and left the plaintiffs unable to advance it. 
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14. 
76 These circumstances are fully described in Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14-16; 
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 4. 
77 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
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March 1989, secured local appointed counsel, and agreed to an in-
dependent plea bargain in April.78 Moreover, the attorneys thought 
that the tactics of the SBI and the Sheriff's office had succeeded in 
eroding the momentum of the petition drive to remove the Sheriff, 
and the SBI apparently had ceased its conspiracy investigation of 
other Robeson County residents.79 
Several factors prompted the three attorneys to withdraw the lit-
igation. Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts believed that certain important 
claims had been mooted; that those which remained could be vin-
dicated in Hatcher's criminal prosecution, the defense of which 
should be paramount; that the case was not moving because dis-
covery had been blocked; and that pursuit of the damage claims 
alone was not worthwhile. 80 
On April 20, Nakell sought from a Deputy Attorney General the 
defendants' approval of a stipulated dismissal with prejudice under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(ii).81 The Deputy rejected 
the request; however, she authorized the plaintiffs to "state that 
defendants did not object to a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 
41(a)(2)."82 Nakell submitted a Rule 41(a)(2) motion, stating that 
defendants' counsel "do not oppose this motion and do not object 
to the Court granting it."83 The district court judge signed the mo-
tion and a proposed order dismissing the case on May 2.IH Neither 
document included any conditions or terms reserving to the de-
fendants the right to take additional action in the suit. ali In short, 
the trial judge dismissed the case three months after the plaintiffs 
filed it and prior to any hearings, discovery, or decisions on sub-
stantive motions. 
78 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 15. 
79 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 15; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at. 4. 
80 Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 15-16. "Subject to the provisions or Rule 23(e), of Rule 
66, and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff 
without order of court ..• (ii) by filing a stipulation or dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action." FEo. R. CIV. P. 4l(a)(l)(ii). 
81 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 4. 
~· Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; accord Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 16. "Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the 
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the 
court deems proper." FEo. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). 
83 Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 4. 
"' Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at. 4-5. 
8° Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 5. "Nor did the defendants mention, let. alone seek, 
any such term or condition." Id. 
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C. RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
On June 13, the state defendants submitted a motion seeking 
Rule 11 sanctions from Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts, and on July 5, 
the county defendants filed a similar motion.86 On August 8, the 
plaintiffs' attorneys responded to these requests and moved for an 
evidentiary hearing. On September 5, the lawyers sought Rule 11 
sanctions against the defendants. 87 After neglecting to rule on the 
request for an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge on September 8 
heard oral argument exclusively on the question of whether Rule 
11 had been violated. He instructed the litigants to submit addi-
tional material only upon request.88 
On September 19, the court asked the state defendants for a 
"short itemized statement in affidavit form showing time and ex-
pense incurred" in the litigation and on September 27 made a sim-
ilar request of the county defendants.89 On the same day, the 
county defendants submitted the requested affidavit. The next 
day, the trial judge signed his order granting sanctions of $92,834, 
the exact amount that all counsel for defendants sought. 90 The 
court levied additional punitive sanctions of $10,000 against each 
of the plaintiffs' three lawyers for making baseless allegations 
against public officials and seeking media attention.91 The plain-
tiffs' attorneys did not receive the response until the judge had 
signed the order, and they had no opportunity to contest the type 
or size of the sanction.92 According to Kunstler's later petition for 
certiorari: 
88 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 16. Governmental pursuit of 
Rule 11 sanctions is somewhat unusual, at least at the federal level. See generally Tobias, 
supra note 38, at 460-61. 
87 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 5. 
88 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512. "This was the first time the district court had met counsel." 
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 16. 
89 Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 8. "Indeed, the 
Clerk actually entered the sanctions order in the docket sheet before it entered any of the 
affidavits of counsel for the State Defendants . . . and never entered the affidavit of counsel 
for the County Defendants." Id. 
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 18. 
•• Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 8. "The Court's letter requesting the affida-
vits, the affidavits themselves, and the order arrived in their mail on the same day, Monday, 
October 2, 1989." Id. The attorneys had no opportunity to assert that the sanctions should 
be nonmonetary or, if monetary, what amount would be proper and whether equitable fac-
tors, such as their ability to pay, should apply. Id. at 8-9. 
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Although the parties' affidavits presented sharply con-
flicting versions of critical facts, the court made its deter-
minations, including evidentiary findings, solely on the 
basis of the affidavits and other written materials, with-
out listening to a word of testimony or permitting the 
cross-examination of any affiant or the talcing of any dep-
osition to help resolve factual con:flicts.93 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION 
917 
The trial judge commented at the outset of the opinion imposing 
the sanctions that the court had "been inundated with written 
materials" on Rule 11 issues and that the state and county "de-
fendants ha[d] written 97 pages of memoranda, the plaintiffs 90."!H 
The district judge preliminarily rejected the plaintiffs' contention 
that the dismissal precluded the defendants from pursuing Rule 11 
sanctions. 95 The court relied primarily on the idea that the "terms 
and conditions that may be imposed upon a voluntary dismissal" 
are for the defendants' protection; this protection is unnecessary 
when the dismissal is with prejudice. 98 
The judge then determined that plaintiffs' counsel had contra-
vened all three prongs of Rule 11. First, the attorneys and parties 
failed to perform reasonable legal inquiries to ensure that the filing 
was in accord with current law or justified by a good faith argu:-
ment for a change in existing law. 97 Second, they failed to conduct 
reasonable factual investigations before filing papers.98 Finally, 
they submitted the complaint for improper purposes.99 The court 
treated the improper-purpose requirement before the other two 
because the lawyers' motives and behavior troubled the judge.100 
93 Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 5. 
"' Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 652 & n.l (E.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in 
part and vacated in part sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). 
9
• Id. at 653. 
""Id. 
97 Id. at 656-59. 
9
• Id. 
09 Id. at 653-56. 
100 Id. at 653-54. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer 
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best 
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in-
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The court found that the plaintiffs' attorneys never meant to lit-
igate the lawsuit under section 1983. They had filed the case to 
generate publicity, to embarrass county and state officials, to gain 
leverage and secure discovery in the criminal prosecution, and to 
intimidate individuals pursuing the prosecution.101 The judge 
based his determinations on inferences derived from several con-
siderations: the fact that one attorney held a press conference 
while another sent a copy of the complaint to the state court judge 
who probably would have conducted the criminal trial, the ability 
of the plaintiffs to obtain discovery otherwise unavailable, the liti-
gation's timing, and, most important, counsel's "sudden and inex-
plicable" decision to dismiss the case with prejudice.102 
The court next stated that the complaint violated another re-
quirement of Rule 11: it was not warranted by existing law.103 The 
judge initially observed that much, if not all, of the pleading failed 
to "show that any plaintiff [was] entitled to any relief."10" The 
court considered what it characterized as several significant claims 
to be lacking legal support. First, the judge rejected the plaintiffs' 
claim based on the Double Jeopardy Clause because that clause 
"does not prohibit subsequent prosecutions by different sover-
eigns. "1011 Second, the court found unsubstantiated the assertion 
that the State violated Hatcher's Fifth Amendment rights by at-
tempting to extract testimony from Jacobs. The Amendment's 
"protection is personal to the individual whose testimony is being 
compelled and cannot protect Hatcher."106 Third, the court de-
cided that federal abstention doctrine clearly barred the plaintiffs' 
request that state criminal proceedings be enjoined, rejecting the 
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 11. 
101 Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 654-56. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 656-57. 
10
' Id. at 656. 
100 Id. The court cited Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (allowing sovereign states to 
prosecute successively same crime due to independent authority), and rejected the plaintiffs' 
"tool of the same authorities" exception premised on Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 
(1959), which argued that one sovereign was acting merely to facilitate the other's prosecu-
tion. Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 656. 
106 Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 656-57. 
1992] CIVIL RIGHTS CONUNDRUM 919 
argument of exceptional circumstances.107 Fourth, the judge be-
lieved that many of the plaintiffs' claims posed serious standing 
problems.108 
The court also found that the complaint was not well-grounded 
in fact and, thus, contravened the third requirement of Rule 11.109 
The judge declared that the plaintiffs had misstated several facts 
to "implicate the defendants in a massive and sinister conspir-
acy. "110 The court specifically observed that, although a principal 
allegation in the complaint was that the defendants reneged on an 
agreement that government officials would not prosecute Hatcher 
and Jacobs in state court, the officers lacked the authority to bind 
the State in this manner.m Moreover, the court said that filing a 
complaint and then participating in discovery "in 'anticipation' 
that the complaint will prove warranted" violates Rule 11.112 Fur-
thermore, the judge found that the complaint was replete with se-
rious allegations of criminal behavior and of malfeasance by high-
ranking governmental officials and that many of these allegations 
purportedly lacked factual substantiation or were irrelevant to the 
litigation.113 
The trial court, in selecting an appropriate sanction, proclaimed 
that such sanctions' primary purpose is "to compensate the of-
fended parties for all reasonable expenses" attributable to the Rule 
107 See id. at 657. The court relied on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to bar in-
junctive relief against criminal proceedings absent a showing of bad faith or lack or reasona-
ble expectation of conviction and chided the plaintiffs for presenting "no cases appl)ing a 
Younger exception which even remotely resembles this case." Robeson Defense Comm., 132 
F.R.D. at 657. 
108 The court relied on Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972), for the idea that "allega-
tions of mere chill without any objective harm is [sic] not grounds for equitable relief." 
Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 657. The court chastised the plaintiffs for failing to 
show a "specific, present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Id. 
100 See Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 657-58 (discussing factual inconsistencies 
in plaintiffs' complaint). 
"
0 Id. at 657. 
m Id. The court criticized counsel for failing to consult the written agreement and the 
transcript of the negotiations leading to release of the hostages, because nothing in those 
materials suggested any promise not to prosecute. Id. 
"
2 Id. at 658. 
113 Id. The plaintiffs' counsel sharply contested some arguments that the court called alle-
gations, such as the charge that the Sheriff was engaged in drug trafficking, and strongly 
argued for the relevance of other facts that the court found irrelevant, such as the death or 
an African-American inmate while in the Sheriff's custody. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' 
allegations). 
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11 violation. 114 The judge thus held the three lawyers jointly and 
severally liable for all attorneys' fees and expenses that defendants 
incurred: $92,834.115 The court also levied "punitive sanctions" of 
$10,000 on each lawyer based on findings that the Rule 11 viola-
tions were egregious and that the attorneys had intentionally filed 
outrageous claims and publicized the allegations against high-rank-
ing officials. 116 
The district judge remarked that he had not imposed sanctions 
lightly. He stated that civil rights lawyers have been instrumental 
in promoting many societal goals and that "Mr. Kunstler has been 
a leading civil rights attorney for many years."117 The court held 
that Rule 11, nevertheless, must apply to all practitioners, observ-
ing that the decision "in no way will deter civil rights lawyers from 
filing legitimate complaints in the future to protect the civil rights 
of others and the Constitution that we all hold so dear."118 
Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts appealed the district court's deci-
sion.119 The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union, the North Caro-
lina Academy of Trial Lawyers, the North Carolina Association of 
Black Lawyers, and the North Carolina Chapter of the National 
Lawyers Guild filed amicus briefs essentially supporting the appel-
lants' views.120 The Washington Legal Foundation, on behalf of it-
self, Senator Jesse Helms, Representatives Howard Coble and Alex 
McMillan, and the Allied Educational Foundation, submitted ami-
cus briefs supporting the lower court decision and favoring the de-
fendants' views.121 Oral argument occurred on June 5, 1990, but 
the Fourth Circuit did not issue an opinion until September. Be-
tween the time Hatcher and Jacobs broke into The Robesonian of-
fices and the appellate court published its determination, there 
were many Rule 11 developments that sharply contrasted with the 
district court's decision. 
114 Id. at 659. 
116 Id. at 659-60. 
116 Id. at 660. The court also barred counsel from practicing before it until they paid the 
sanctions. Id. 
111 Id. at 659. 
116 Id. 
11
• Morton Stavis of the Center for Constitutional Rights represented all three attorneys. 
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). 
120 See id. (identifying amici curiae for appellants). 
121 See id. (identifying amici curiae for appellees). 
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IV. RULE 11 DEVELOPMENTS FROM EARLY 1988 UNTIL SEPTEllmER 
1990 
Beginning in 1988 and continuing through September 1990, 
many courts rendered Rule 11 decisions favorable to civil rights 
plaintiffs and practitioners.122 Nearly all of the circuit courts pub-
lished opinions that recognized the needs of civil rights plaintiffs. 
For instance, some appellate judges expressed concern that exces-
sively vigorous implementation of the Rule could chill the litigants' 
enthusiasm or undermine zealous advocacy.123 A few circuit courts 
treated the limited time that practitioners have to conduct reason-
able prefiling inquiries as a significant factor in deciding whether 
civil rights attorneys had contravened Rule 11. 12' Appellate judges 
also exhibited concern for civil rights plaintiffs when considering 
the kinds of sanctions imposed. Many courts suggested that dis-
trict judges seriously consider nonmonetary assessments or the vio-
lators' ability to pay when calculating pecuniary awards. m Trial 
courts similarly improved their formal enforcement of the Rule in 
civil rights cases. Some district judges refused to find that pro se 
plaintiffs or plaintiffs who were litigating cases that appeared weak 
had contravened Rule 11.128 Some trial courts were reluctant to 
122 See Tobias, supra note 24, at 166·71 (citing primary sources); Tobias, supra note 31, 
at 110·16 (same). 
12
• See Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rule 11 
advisory committee notes to 1983 amendment); accord Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 
F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that sanctions could chill facially meritless and weak 
but viable claims); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that chilling effect 
is not purpose of Rule 11). 
m See Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 421 (8th Cir.) (stating that time for inquiry was 
limited by approaching school term), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 346 (1990); Gillette v. Delmore, 
886 F.2d 1194, 1199·1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that attorney was retained shortly before 
statute of limitations had run); accord Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(Butzner, J., dissenting) (noting that filing of complaint to meet statute of limitations made 
extensive inquiry impracticable). 
12
• See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (suggesting 
use of ability·to·pay standard); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholdezs, 857 
F.2d 191, 195·97 (3d Cir. 1988) (recommending ability to pay as one of mitigating factors 
court should consider); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs. 836 F.2d 866, 876·81 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(discussing ability to pay and nonmonetary sanctions for appropriate cases). 
128 E.g., Moore v. Roth, No. A-01422, 1990 WL 60735 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1990) (involving 
prose litigant); Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. lll. 1989) (involving prose 
litigant); Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 686 (D. Minn. 1990) (finding no violation 
of Rule 11 in weak COBRA case); Summer v. Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (N.D. Ga. 
1989) (finding no violation of Rule 11 in civil rights case of first impression). 
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levy large monetary assessments against civil rights plaintiffs or 
their counsel.121 
The Fourth Circuit contributed to these national trends. For ex-
ample, one panel of the court, when vacating a trial judge's deci-
sion that Rule 11 had been violated in Title VII litigation, 
observed: 
Even a vague and conclusory complaint may be "well 
grounded in fact and . . . warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Indeed, if 
Rule 11 permitted sanctions merely on the basis of in-
artful pleading, rather than for a failure to investigate 
the legal and factual basis for that pleading, Rule 12(e) 
motions for a more definite statement would be virtually 
unheard of.128 
Other panels expressed similar concern for civil rights plaintiffs 
and lawyers when reviewing sanctions that district courts 
imposed.129 
The conclusion that Rule ll's application improved between 
early 1988 and September 1990 must be qualified. Some judges ap-
parently failed to appreciate several subtleties involved in enforc-
ing Rule 11130 or were insufficiently attentive to the needs of civil 
127 See, e.g., the district court opinion referred to in Banov, 899 F.2d at 40, 42; Cruz v. 
Savage, 691 F. Supp. 549, 556 (D.P.R. 1988) (noting this reluctance), aff'd, 896 F.2d 626 (1st 
Cir. 1990). 
128 Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990). 
129 See, e.g., Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 899 F.2d 271, 290 (4th Cir.) (affirming 
district court's denial of sanctions without review), reh'g granted and vacated on other 
grounds, 922 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1990) (en bane), on reh'g, 925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir.) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2814 (1991); Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 970 (4th Cir. 
1988) (vacating award of sanctions because district court's findings were insufficient to jus· 
tify sanctions). 
130 Most important was the failure to differentiate between the "product" (focusing on 
the complaint or other documents) and "conduct" (focusing on prefiling inquiry) approaches 
to Rule 11 decisionmaking. See, e.g., Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (finding complaint not frivolous and denying sanctions on that basis rather than 
analyzing reasonableness of plaintiff's investigation); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified 
Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding sanctions against civil rights 
plaintiff for frivolous claim). See generally Burbank, supra note 20, at 1933-34, 1941-42 
(sugges~ing that judges impose sanctions for conduct reasons only); Tobias, supra note 24, 
at 168 (noting that courts use frivolous-product approach). 
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rights plaintiffs when choosing sanctions.131 Moreover, the im-
provements observed have been in formal Rule 11 decisionmaking. 
This distinction is important because a significant quantity of Rule 
11 activity is informal, as is much activity that is most detrimental 
to civil rights plaintiffs.132 Furthermore, in June 1990, the Supreme 
Court prescribed a very deferential abuse-of-discretion standard 
for appellate review of trial court Rule 11 decisionmaking.133 
Additional developments that did not directly involve the Rule's 
judicial application could lead to improvements for civil rights 
plaintiffs. The Advisory Committee, during its regularly scheduled 
meeting in November 1989, spent one-half day discussing Rule ll's 
implementation. Two representatives of public interest organiza-
tions presented evidence that the Rule was detrimentally affecting 
civil rights plaintiffs.134 At the conclusion of the meeting, the Com-
mittee informally agreed to explore the possibility of an 
amendment.1311 
A short time thereafter, Representative Robert Kastenmeier, 
Chairman of the House Committee on the Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Administration of Justice, contacted Judge John 
Grady, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, requesting informa-
131 See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fin. 1989) (imposing $1 million 
sanction against civil rights plaintiff), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 913 (1992). 
10
• Formal Rule 11 activity leads to the issuance of an opinion tlw.t is published in the 
federal reporter system or is available on one of the computerized reporting systems. Infor-
mal Rule 11 activity is all other activity, including threats to invoke the Rule. Informal 
activity can be more detrimental because it is difficult to detect, document, and alter at the 
appellate level. See generally Tobias, supra note 31, at 117 (arguing tlw.t hostility to liti-
gants is more likely to appear in informal settings). 
1
" See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (prescribing deferential 
abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review). Another recent Supreme Court Rule 11 
opinion could be detrimental to civil rights plaintiffs, because it applies the Rule's require-
ments to represented parties who sign papers. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communi-
cations Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct.. 1076 (1992) 
(allowing courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions when court is later determined to be without 
subject-matter jurisdiction). 
1
"' They were attorney Alan Morrison of Public Citizen and Professor Laura Macklin of 
the Georgetown University Law Center Institute for Public Representation. Linda S. Mul-
lenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemak-
ing, 69 N.C. L. R.Ev. 795, 854 n.310 (1991). 
1
•• Telephone Interview with Charles Geyh, Professor of Law, Widener University, Har-
risburg, Pa., and former counsel, House Committee on the Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Administration of Justice (June 17, 1992). See generally Mullenix, supra note 134, 
at 854. 
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tion on the committee's consideration of Rule 11.136 In February 
1990, Judge Grady responded to Representative Kastenmeier, ex-
pressing his belief that there was considerable need for additional 
study of the Rule and for more data on its operation. 137 
Professor Arthur Miller, who was the Reporter for the Advisory 
Committee when the Supreme Court and Congress promulgated 
the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
wrote in July 1990 that "[i]t would be unfortunate if the decibel 
level of the debate over Rule 11 led to its precipitous revision 
before sufficient experience accumulated."138 Professor Miller as-
serted that "considerable progress has been made" but urged pa-
tience, recognizing that the process of refining the Rule's enforce-
ment "will take many more years.m39 
On July 24, 1990, nearly seven years after amended Rule 11 be-
came effective, the Advisory Committee announced that it was ini-
tiating a study of Rule 11.140 The Committee called for the public 
to submit written comments on the Rule's operation by November 
1; scheduled a hearing for February 1991, at which time it planned 
to receive oral testimony; and said that it would consider revision 
of Rule 11 at the Committee's regular meeting in April 1991.141 
v. THE CIRCUIT COURT OPINION 
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
On September 18, 1990, a panel of the Fourth Circuit issued its 
opinion in In re Kunstler. 142 The appellate court reviewed all of 
136 Telephone Interview, supra note 135. 
137 Letter from Judge John Grady, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
to Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Committee on the Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Administration of Justice (Feb. 9, 1990) (copy on file with the Georgia 
Law Review). 
136 Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 505 
(1990). 
139 Id. Professor Melissa Nelken, who has studied Rule 11 closely, urged similar caution 
while recommending constructive changes in the Rule. See Melissa Nelken, Has the Chan· 
cellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 383, 385, 405-08 (1990) (arguing against repeal of Rule 11); cf. Carl Tobias, 
Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223 (1991) (response to Professor Miller's article). 




1 Call for Comments, supra note 30, at 345. 
142 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). On the same day, a 
different panel issued an opinion in another controversial civil rights case involving Julius 
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the trial judge's determinations pursuant to an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.143 It found that the defendants' failure to notify the trial 
judge or plaintiffs before dismissal that the state and the county 
intended to invoke Rule 11 would not preclude consideration of a 
motion for sanctions under the Rule.144 The Fourth Circuit upheld 
the lower court's decision that Kunstler, Nakell and Pitts had con-
travened all three prongs of Rule 11.m The appellate panel va-
cated and remanded for reconsideration the district judge's deter-
mination regarding the appropriate sanction. The circuit court 
found that the lower court had based its assessment on the errone-
ous propositions that Rule ll's principal purpose was compensa-
tion and that publicizing the litigation's allegations was behavior 
punishable under the Rule.146 The panel held that due process re-
quired that the attorneys have an opportunity to challenge the 
type and amount of sanctions imposed, although the court said 
that the district judge need not hold an evidentiary hearing for any 
of his Rule 11 decisions.1" 7 
Several aspects of the Fourth Circuit determination are particu-
larly striking and warrant criticism. The appellate court reviewed 
the trial court's determination with extreme deference, failing to 
scrutinize the district court's findings that plaintiffs' counsel con-
travened the Rule and selectively considering the plaintiffs' asser-
tions. The Fourth Circuit accepted uncritically, and adopted nearly 
verbatim, many propositions, even ideas relating to legal issues, in 
the trial judge's opinion. The appellate panel also refused to delve 
deeply into the case's factual background, endorsing wholeheart-
edly the trial court's version of the facts, while failing to mention 
the seventy-page memorandum that Nakell filed in response to 
Chambers, Executive Director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which was an appeal 
from the decision of a different judge in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Blue v. 
United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding counsel's conduct war-
ranted sanctions but district court failed to exercise selectivity in imposing wide range of 
sanctions and to be sensitive to deterrence its decision may have on future Title VII liti-
gants with meritorious claims), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). Although disposition of 
the two cases was similar, the two panels' scrutiny of the facts and treatment of the attor-
neys contrasts markedly. Some of those contrasts will be examined in the footnotes below. 
143 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 513 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 
(1990)) •. 
iu Id. at 512-13 . 
... Id. at 513-21. 
14
• Id. at 522-25. 
147 Id. at 521-22. 
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questions at oral argument.148 This type of appellate review penal-
izes parties found to have violated Rule 11 in cases such as this one 
when district judges vigorously apply the provision. 
B. SPECIFIC ANALYSIS 
1. Sanctions After Dismissal. The panel first observed that the 
defendants' failure before dismissal to notify the plaintiffs or the 
district' court of the defendants' intent to seek Rule 11 sanctions 
would not necessarily bar a sanctions motion.149 The appellate 
court acknowledged that certain equitable factors, such as a party's 
promise not to pursue sanctions or an inordinately long delay after 
voluntary dismissal before filing a Rule 11 motion, could preclude 
sanctions.1110 Because the State invoked Rule 11 six weeks after dis-
missal and the county filed its motion several weeks later, the 
panel found that the delay did not prejudice the plaintiffs' lawyers 
and that the district judge properly considered the motion. 161 In 
comparison, some courts have held that a district judge should not 
grant a: Rule 11 motion filed after a plaintiff has sought dismissal 
under Rule 4l(a)(2) and after entry of an order dismissing with 
prejudice upon the defendant's consent, if the order includes no 
term or condition reserving the right to seek sanctions.152 Defend-
ants who wish to preserve the right to invoke Rule 11 normally 
should respond with cross-motions to the plaintiffs' Rule 4l(a)(2) 
motion to dismiss.1113 Numerous courts have denied sanctions mo-
tions that defendants filed after Rule 4l(a)(2) dismissals when the 
parties failed to reserve their rights. 1114 
148 Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3. 
149 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512-13. 
100 Id. at 513. 
IOI Id. 
••• See, e.g., Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 133-35 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to allow 
Rule 11 sanctions after voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)); see also 
Lau v. Glendora Unified School Dist., 792 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing plain-
tiff's right to withdraw voluntary dismissal rather than comply with order imposing attor-
ney's fees); Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1037 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing proper 
use of Rule 41(a)(2) by district court). 
••
3 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Hilton Int'! Co., 870 F.2d 926, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting 
defendant's cross-motion for sanctions, fees, and costs); Kya-Hill v. Davidson, No. 87 CIV. 
7802 (JES), 1988 WL 108487 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1988) (noting that defendants could file 
cross-motion after 41(a)(2) dismissal). 
••• See, e.g., Roe v. Operation Rescue, Civ. A. No. 88-5157, 1989 WL 66452 (E.D. Pa. June 
19, 1989) (holding motions after final judgment untimely), order aff'd, 892 F.2d 142 (3d 
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2. Violations of Rule 11. The trial judge found that plaintiffs' 
counsel had contravened Rule 11 's three prongs. The Fourth Cir-
cuit first examined the liability of Kunstler, who said that he did 
not participate actively in the case but depended on Nakell, "who 
was on the scene, to prepare and file it."111 t1 The appellate panel 
decided that a recent Supreme Court pronouncement supported 
the district judge's determination that Kunstler's complete reli-
ance on another attorney itself contravened Rule 11. 1116 
a. Well Grounded in Fact. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the 
district court judge that the factual misstatements in the com-
plaint were pervasive and that these errors involved information 
that the plaintiffs' attorneys knew or should have known.1117 The 
panel also remarked that some causes of action were premised on 
allegations that "utterly lacked" any factual basis, commenting 
that such claims constitute the very litigation abuse at which Rule 
11 is aimed.1158 The Fourth Circuit correspondingly upheld the trial 
judge's findings that many allegations against local and state offi-
cials were factually unsubstantiated or were irrelevant to the 
case.1159 The relationship between discovery and Rule 11 also was 
important to the appellate court's determinations. The panel 
stated that for the Rule's purposes, the prefiling factual investiga-
tion to support a complaint generally will suffice, if all of the infor-
mation that can be secured before suit substantiates the pleading's 
allegations, although additional facts must be secured with discov-
ery to prove the claim ultimately.160 
The Fourth Circuit chastised the plaintiffs' attorneys for includ-
ing factual inaccuracies, irrelevant material, and unsupported alle-
gations in the complaint. The panel's treatment of the facts war-
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 385 (1990); Feldman v. Village of Lombard, No. SS C 3295, 
1987 WL 9000 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 1987) (holding that defendants had waived rights during 
4l(a)(2) hearing). 
1
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 513-14 (emphasis added by court). 
1
•• See id. at 514 (citing Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Di\•. of Ca-
dence Indus. Corp., 493 U.S. 120 (1989)). "Having failed in his responsibility, l.\ir. Kunstler 
may not now be heard to protest that he does not share in any violations of Rule 11 which 
are evident on the face of the complaint." Id. 
107 See id. (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that errors were isolated). 
10
• Id. at 514-15. The example used was the allegation regarding a "no state prosecution" 
agreement, which the court found that North Carolina law did not authorize. Id. 
1
•• "[T]he complaint was filled with irrelevant allegations not tied to specific injuries to 
plaintiffs ••.. " Id. at 515. 
1
•• Id. at 516. 
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rants criticism, however. Most important, the court considered the 
complaint filed to the almost total exclusion of the attorneys' be-
havior in conducting the factual investigation that preceded the 
complaint's drafting, thus significantly de-emphasizing Rule ll's 
reasonable prefiling inquiry language. 
The Fourth Circuit accepted most of the defendants' specula-
tions and rejected practically all of the plaintiffs' evidence. The 
court concomitantly gave virtually no credence to the explanations 
of plaintiffs' counsel for their actions in performing the factual in-
quiry and actually capitalized on the explanations to disparage the 
attorneys. For instance, Nakell and Pitts proffered thorough "affi-
davits, correspondence, court papers," and proofs of the time spent 
investigating to detail the reasonableness of their factual in-
quiry.161 The panel responded that the lawyers had offered no ex-
cuse for the numerous clear errors of fact in their complaint, par-
ticularly given the ample time that they ostensibly had to prepare 
the pleading and the hours purportedly expended in drafting it.162 
Moreover, the circuit court mischaracterized and selectively ana-
lyzed certain allegations in the plaintiffs' pleading, undertook scant 
review of the pertinent underlying facts, adopted uncritically much 
material in the district judge's opinion, and embraced his version 
of the facts, although the trial court had little more familiarity 
with the facts than the appellate court. 163 Illustrative of most of 
these phenomena is the emphasis accorded to allegations that the 
Sheriff was participating in drug trafficking.164 Nakell vehemently 
and convincingly denied that the plaintiffs had made such an alle-
gation; in any event, whatever allusion they made to drug traffick-
ing was inconsequential.1615 
181 Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 18. 
182 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516. 
183 The panel arguably seized on "isolated factual errors," thus violating its own prece-
dent in Forrest Creek Assocs. v. McLean Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 831 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (4th 
Cir. 1987). Cf. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 540 (4th Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that complaint's allegations and supporting evidence should be set forth with "generous 
reading" they are due or with "strongest evidence" they presented), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
1580 (1991). But see Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 514 (noting errors not isolated but pervaded 
complaint). As to the trial court's limited familiarity with the facts, see supra note 88; infra 
note 225 and accompanying text. 
18
' See Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 515 (suggesting that allegations were scandalous and 
sensational). 
18
• Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 2-3; cf. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 23 
(noting panel's mischaracterization of complaint's central allegations). 
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The appellate court also seemed to suggest that plaintiffs in the 
Fourth Circuit can rely less on discovery for Rule 11 purposes than 
plaintiffs in other circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, several of 
whose members have championed vigorous enforcement of the 
Rule.166 This issue is important because, in civil rights cases, plain-
tiffs often depend substantially on information that can be secured 
only through discovery, since the material is in the minds or files 
of def eiidants-in this case, law enforcement officials. 167 The role 
of discovery is significant to the instant case because the case in-
volved a multitude of sharply disputed factual issues, some of 
which could not be clarified or resolved until discovery.168 
Finally, several examples demonstrate the panel's selective ap-
proach to appellate review. First, the Fourth Circuit found that a 
single subcomponent of one of the plaintiffs' six claims lacked a 
factual basis, 169 but the court failed to analyze closely the other, 
more substantial factual premises in the complaint. The district 
judge and the panel also seized on a lone sentence in the plaintiffs' 
memorandum that sought expedited discovery; both courts in-
ferred that the lawyers "relied entirely upon discovery in the hope 
of finding some factual support for many of their claims" and con-
166 Compare Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that use 
of discovery to learn facts of case is reasonable) (discussed in Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516) and 
Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that 
use of discovery to prove case is permissible) with Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 
823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that use of discovery as sole means of establish-
ing case is impermissible), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). See also supra note 35 and 
accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit judges' advocacy of vigorous enforcement of 
Rule 11). 
167 See Tobias, supra note 19, at 494-95, 498 (citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987), as valuable illustration of civil rights action 
in which important information was in minds and records of defendants as well as for state-
ment that "those who challenge police violations of an individual's civil rights need not 
secure the detailed information required to prove patterns of supervisory misconduct prior 
to filing, because citizens are 'extremely unlikely' to have that data before formal 
discovery"). 
168 For instance, whether the state authorities indicated to Hatcher that there was a "no 
state prosecution" agreement was a significant, sharply contested factual issue. Similarly, 
establishing the "tool of the same authorities" exception that would permit a double jeop-
ardy claim was dependent on showing a nexus between federal and state prosecutors. Both 
required discovery, which the district judge prevented. Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 
18; see also supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing court-ordered stay of 
discovery). 
160 This was the claim that there had been a "no state prosecution" agreement, one of 
several premises for seeking injunctive relief. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 29 & n.3. 
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eluded that this dependence indicated an "unacceptable level of 
pre-filing investigation."110 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit practi-
cally ignored counsel's prefiling inquiry,171 a phenomenon illus-
trated by this terse quotation charging an "unacceptable level of 
pre-filing investigation." In fact, in the court's only other reference 
to the investigation, it concluded that the investigation failed to 
excuse the "many clear factual errm;s" included in the com-
plaint.172 The panel's focus on the quality of the product-the 
complaint, its factual allegations, and counsel's ability to prove 
them-to the nearly complete exclusion of the attorneys' behavior 
in performing the prefiling inquiry that underlies the paper im-
properly underemphasizes significant language in Rule 11.173 Ele-
vating the importance of product over conduct is particularly inad-
visable in cases, such as this one, in which there is a wealth of 
information available regarding the prefiling investigation that 
plaintiffs actually undertook.174 
110 In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). 
The sentence was in counsel's memorandum in opposition to the State's motion seeking a 
protective order. It emphasized that the discovery sought would permit plaintiffs' counsel to 
augment their evidence and satisfy Rule 65(b)'s requirements for temporary injunctive re-
lief. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 43-44 & n.14. Rule 65(b) states: 
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to 
the adverse party or that party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from 
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate 
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the 
adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the 
applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which 
have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that 
notice should not be required. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 65(b). 
111 The panel extracted little from the record or from Nakell's post-oral-argument memo· 
randum, supra note 3, both of which detailed the extensive prefiling inquiry that counsel 
conducted. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 41 & n.12. 
172 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516. The court identified one kind of alleged error, and that 
error implicated the plaintiffs' allegations regarding several officials who made policy for 
Robeson County. The panel rejected the claims because the officers were state employees, 
not county officials. The panel asserted that this distinction was integral to the complaint 
and the allegation of a countywide conspiracy; however, the panel was wrong. Pitts Petition, 
supra note 1, at 45-57. 
173 See supra note 100 for the relevant language from Rule 11. The court should initially 
attempt to determine whether counsel performed a reasonable prefiling inquiry (conduct). 
Only when that effort proves inconclusive should the judge analyze the papers (product) 
that the inquiry yielded to make the reasonableness determination. Tobias, supra note 31, 
at 108 n.11. 
"' "Nakell and Pitts were entirely steeped in the facts of the case and had made a thor· 
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b. Well Grounded in Law. The Fourth Circuit upheld the trial 
judge's determination that the plaintiffs' attorneys filed a com-
plaint that "ori the whole was not well grounded in law."170 The 
analysis resembled the appellate review of the district court's find-
ing that the pleading was not well-grounded in fact. The panel es-
sentially ignored the prefiling inquiry that counsel conducted, the 
plaintiffs' substantial claims, and their arguments for extending 
existing law. It emphasized, however, several relatively insignifi-
cant claims that the trial judge decided were unsubstantiated and 
adopted practically whole cloth the lower court's treatment. 116 
The sanctioned attorneys argued that the defendants' lengthy 
answers to the complaint and the approval of the complaint by a 
civil rights lawyer with expertise in section 1983 litigation substan-
tiated the validity of the complaint's legal premise. The Fourth 
Circuit flatly rejected these arguments. m The court stated that the 
length of the defendants' responses would not make otherwise un-
supported claims legitimate and might signify only that there were 
numerous meritorious defenses.118 Merely securing review of a 
pleading by an attorney with specialized knowledge did not satisfy 
Rule 11, because that lawyer may have little familiarity with the 
particular facts, the pertinent law, or the prefiling investigation.119 
The panel's summary treatment of the contentions of the sanc-
tioned attorneys, especially regarding review of the complaint, ac-
corded insufficient importance to whether the plaintiffs performed 
a reasonable prefiling inquiry.180 
The Fourth Circuit then analyzed what it characterized as "sev-
eral substantial claims" that the trial judge determined lacked le-
gal foundation.181 The panel held the plaintiffs' double jeopardy 
ough investigation. The papers filed .•• included a massive collection of affida\its, corre· 
spondence, court papers and materials .••• " Kuns tier Petition, supra note 6, at 18. 
"" Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518. 
176 For example, the panel apparently conducted virtually no independent research on the 
legal issues. 
177 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516-17. 
n8 Id. 
11
• Id. at 517. 
18° Counsel seemed to offer the details of the review principally to show reasonable con-
duct, although the panel emphasized product. See generally supra note 173. 
1
•
1 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517. The court also ignored the cltlims, such as those invoMng 
the First Amendment, that the plaintiffs' counsel considered substantial. See supra text 
accompanying note 176. 
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claim inapplicable to subsequent prosecutions by different sover-
eigns.182 The court acknowledged the "tool of the same authorities" 
exception but found that it should be restricted to situations that 
involved limited state participation. 183 The panel held the excep-
tion inapplicable because the complaint alleged that state officials 
orchestrated the state prosecution, even though counsel had made 
a plausible good-faith argument for extending the exception to in-
stances in which state, not federal, officials predominate.184 
The appellate court next upheld the district judge's decision that 
the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim had no legal support, stat-
ing that the Amendment's "protection is personal to the individual 
whose testimony is being compelled."1811 The Fourth Circuit ob-
served that the plaintiffs' counsel "as experienced attorneys should 
have been well aware of this" constitutional rule and criticized 
them for not attempting "to explain away this glaring blunder."186 
The treatment reveals more about the appellate court than the 
lawyers. As Nakell stated in his memorandum filed after oral argu-
ment, the trial judge and the circuit court chose to ignore the 
plaintiffs' substantial and correctly pleaded Sixth Amendment 
claim and instead seized upon a minor mistake in one paragraph 
that also based the claim on the Fifth Amendment.187 
The panel affirmed the district court's determination that ab-
stention doctrine clearly precluded plaintiffs from enjoining state 
criminal proceedings.188 The Fourth Circuit, relying on contrary in-
tracircuit precedent, refused to find that exceptional circumstances 
justifying federal intervention exist when prosecutions are pursued 
182 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517. 
183 Id. (citing United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The exception is 
that a state prosecution that follows an unsuccessful federal prosecution can violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the state prosecution results from ma· 
nipulation by federal authorities. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
Neither the Supreme Court nor the District of Columbia Circuit, however, has limited the 
exception in the way the Fourth Circuit limited it. 
184 The argument for extension is that the exception should apply equally to ·state and 
federal authorities. Petition For Rehearing and Suggestion For Rehearing In Banc at 9, 
Kunstler (No. 89-2815) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing]. 
18° Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517. 
188 Id. 
187 Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at A12 n.3; accord Petition for Rehearing, 
supra note 184, at 7; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 35 & n.8. 
188 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517. 
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to discourage citizens from exercising constitutional rights.189 The 
plaintiffs, however, had offered two convincing grounds for distin-
guishing that case.190 Moreover, even if the precedent were control-
ling within the circuit, Rule 11 expressly permits good-faith argu-
ments for changes in the law that are premised on decisions of the 
Supreme Court and other circuits. 191 
The Fourth Circuit likewise upheld the trial judge's finding that 
a number of claims raised serious standing difficulties.192 The panel 
invoked a narrow example and technically applied standing doc-
trille to require that Hatcher and Jacobs show concrete and spe-
cific harm; the court determined that the particular plaintiffs had 
failed to make this showing because they had the fortitude to resist 
governmental intimidation.193 
2
•• Id. The precedent is Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1980). 
190 In Suggs, the plaintiffs argued that the obscenity statute under which they were prose-
cuted was unconstitutional. 804 F.2d at 277-78. Moreover, the court in Suggs relied on lan-
guage in a footnote in a Supreme Court opinion stating that "bad faith in this context gen-
erally means" a certain type of prosecution. Id. at 278 (citing Kugler v. Helfont, 421 U.S. 
117, 126 n.6 (1975) (emphasis added)). Use of the term "generally," which lea..-es open the 
possibility of specific exceptions, makes plausible the type of argument premised on "bad 
- faith" prosecution in Kunstler. See generally Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184, at 11-
12 (distinguishing Suggs). 
191 Rule 11 states, 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer 
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best 
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in· 
quiry it is well grounded in facf and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. . . . 
FED. R. Crv. P. 11; cf. United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that precedent from district court in another federal circuit contrary to position of 
plaintiff does not render position frivolous); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 801 F.2d 746, 
758-59 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that absence of First Circuit precedent did not preclude 
good-faith argument for extension of law); Danese v. City of Roseville, 757 F. Supp. 827, 830 
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that precedent in other circuits contrary to party's position does 
not render that position unreasonable); see Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184, at 11 
(arguing that challenges to controlling precedent in circuit do not violate Rule 11 as long as 
consistent with Supreme Court and other circuits' opinions); cf. Kunstler Petition, supra 
note 6, at 19 (arguing that discovery is necessary on exceptional-circumstances issue). 
192 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517. 
193 Id. at 517-18. Hatcher and Jacobs, however, did show the kinds of particularized iden-
tifiable governmental violations of rights that other courts have held to afford a reasonable 
basis for stating a cognizable claim for the purposes of Rule 11. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 
481 U.S. 465, 472-75 (holding that risk of injury to reputation and of impairment to political 
career provided plaintiff with standing to challenge governmental action); Allee v. Medrano, 
416 U.S. 802, 811-14 (1974) (holding that persistent pattern of police misconduct is suili-
cient basis for federal court to exercise equitable powers); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 27 
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c. Improper Purpose. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial 
court's determination that counsel filed suit for an improper pur-
pose and its decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the is-
sue for similar reasons.194 The panel stated that the finding of im-
proper purpose was not "clearly erroneous," was supported by the 
baseless allegations made in the complaint and by the "cumulative 
nature of the evidence," and would not have been modified had the 
district judge held an evidentiary hearing. m 
The appellate court remarked that Rule ll's definition of im-
proper purpose, which includes considerations such as harassment 
or causing unwarranted delay or unnecessary increase in litigation 
expense, is not exclusive.198 The circuit panel observed that it 
would be improper to file a complaint that did not have as its cen-
tral and sincere purpose the vindication of rights in court.197 This 
articulation is simply incorrect; the Supreme Court has long held 
that the First Amendment right to petition prohibits punishing 
persons who pursue legitimate litigation for an apparently inappro-
priate purpose.198 This Fourth Circuit ruling is one of several en-
tered in extremely controversial cases in which judges premised 
findings of Rule 11 violations on determinations that plaintiffs had 
instituted suit primarily for a purpose other than vindicating 
rights through the legal process.199 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Whatever authority the Government may have to interfere with a group 
engaged in unlawful activity, ... it is never permissible to impede or deter lawful civil 
rights/political organization, expression or protest with no other direct purpose and no other 
immediate objective than to counter the influence of the target associations."). See gener· 
ally Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184, at 4-5 (discussing plaintiffs' showing of specific 
harm). 
19
' Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518-21. 
19
• Id. at 520-21. The panel's invocation of a "clearly erroneous" standard is curious be-
cause it specifically stated that an abuse-of-discretion standard would govern. Id. at 513. 
19
• Id. at 518. 
191 Id. 
198 See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (holding that 
well-founded lawsuit brought for retaliatory purposes is not to be enjoined as unfair busi-
ness practice); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 
(1972) (finding that parties are entitled to use courts to "advocate their causes and points of 
view·respecting resolution of their business and economic interests in relation to their com-
petitors" unless argument is nothing more than attempt to interfere directly with business 
of competitors). 
199 E.g., Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 
(1990); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992). 
In Saltany, 55 citizens and residents of Libya filed suit to recover for injuries sustained in 
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The appeals court stated that the district judge's conclusion that 
the plaintiffs' attorneys never intended to litigate the case most 
strongly supported the improper-purpose finding.200 The presence 
of so many allegations that lacked a basis in law or fact justified 
this finding. 201 The existence of baseless allegations could be due to 
inexperience or incompetence, which would not require a finding of 
improper purpose.202 The panel reasoned, however, that the inser-
tion of baseless allegations in the complaint could not be ascribed 
to inexperience because the attorneys clearly were experienced, 
while the number of claims lacking foundation suggested that the 
assertions were not attributable to incompetence.203 The court as-
sumed that "counsel wilfully included the baseless claims" and 
that a judge could infer that the lawyers had filed the lawsuit to 
harass or for some purpose other than vindicating their clients' 
the 1986 bombing of their country by the United States. 886 F.2d at 439. The trial judge 
dismissed the complaint but rejected Rule 11 sanctions in an effort to maintain federal 
courts as fora for litigation brought as a "public statement of protest of Presidential action 
with which counsel (and, to be sure, their clients) were in profound disagreement." Id. 
(quoting district court opinion in Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.D.C. 19SS)). 
The appellate court summarily reversed, instructed the district judge to levy an appropriate 
sanction, and observed that it did "not conceive it a proper function of a federal court to 
serve as a forum for 'protests,' to the detriment of parties with serious disputes waiting to 
be heard." Id. at 440. 
Avirgan arguably resembles Saltany, insofar as the litigation can be characterized as a 
protest against allegedly inappropriate political behavior of the United States in Latin 
America. In Avirgan, journalists filed suit to recover for injuries sustained in a bombing at a 
press conference in Nicaragua. 932 F.2d at 1575. The plaintiffs' lead counsel supplemented 
the complaint with a detailed affidavit outlining the purported testimony of 79 witnesses 
who counsel claimed had knowledge that the defendants set and exploded the bomb. Id. at 
1581. The plaintiffs' counsel, however, would not provide the names of these witnesses and, 
thus, prevented the defendants from deposing those witnesses and delayed orderly discov-
ery. Id. At the same time, the plaintiffs were permitted to conduct two years of discovery. 
Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989). When the plaintiffs' counsel even-
tually complied with the order to reveal the names of their witnesses, the court discovered 
that approximately 20 of the 79 were unknown to the plaintiffs' counsel, several did not 
know or had not spoken to the plaintiffs' counsel, and the remainder could not furnish any 
admissible statements. 932 F.2d at 1581. Upholding the award or costs and attorneys' fees 
after undertaking very deferential review, the court stated, "[F]iling a lawsuit is not a gratu-
itous license to conduct infinite forays in search or evidence." Id. at 1582 (quoting Collins v. 
Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 965 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
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rights.20' 
The appellate panel also stated that the trial judge "inf erred an 
improper purpose from the timing" of the complaint's filing and of 
its dismissal,205 while he considered incredible or absurd the expla-
nations that counsel proffered.208 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged 
that the attorneys had submitted affidavits that sharply disputed 
the district judge's determinations.207 The appellate court, how-
ever, refused to find clearly erroneous the trial judge's decisions 
that the explanations were not believable or reasonable, given all 
of the evidence regarding the filing of the pleading and the frivo-
lous character of the allegations asserted. 208 
The Fourth Circuit did caution that district courts should exer-
cise particular care in assessing the purpose of a party or an attor-
ney who signs a pleading or other court document, adding that an 
evidentiary hearing might be required when there are credibility 
issues, contested factual questions, or reasoned explanations of 
purpose afforded. 200 The panel apparently failed to appreciate that 
these were the very types of factors that underlay much of the trial 
judge's improper-purpose finding arid its own affirmance of that 
decision. Indeed, each court's resolution of the improper-purpose 
question is problematic, because both are grounded in unsupported 
speculation, inference derived from apparently false premises, and 
the rejection of counsel's rational explanations.210 
204 Id. 
20
• Id. Plaintiffs filed on the "eve of the anniversary of the takeover of The Robesonian." 
Id. 
206 The trial court found incredible the explanation that numerous claims had become 
moot and absurd the assertion that the "wide-spread conspiracy involving high-level" offi-
cials suddenly had become insignificant. Id. 
207 Id. at 520. 
2os Id. 
20
• Id. The panel criticized several additional aspects of the trial judge's improper-pur-
pose determination, such as his consideration of improper purpose before reasonable prefil-
ing inquiry. Id. at 518. The weight of authority is against sanctioning for improper purpose 
when a reasonable inquiry precedes a paper's filing. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852 
F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that counsel's reliance on several decisions from 
another jurisdiction and on conference with bankruptcy judge before filing complaint indi-
cated reasonable inquiry and precluded sanctions); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 836 
F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A] complaint that is found to be well-grounded in fact 
and law cannot be sanctioned as harassing, regardless of the attorney's subjective intent."). 
210 The Fourth Circuit's convoluted reasoning discussed in the text accompanying notes 
203-204 is typical. See generally Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 57-59. The panel again 
seemed to emphasize product unduly, especially in light of considerable evidence regarding 
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3. Due Process. The Fourth Circuit held that "due process does 
not require an evidentiary hearing before sanctions are imposed," 
even when the court depends in part on Rule ll's improper-
purpose prong.211 The panel relied substantially on a leading Fifth 
Circuit case and the Advisory Committee Note that accompanied 
Rule 11 to ascertain whether, and if so what type of, a hearing is 
necessary before a judge levies sanctions.212 An observation in the 
Note, which the Fifth Circuit and many other courts recite, is that, 
when the court's involvement in the substantive proceedings af-
fords it thorough appreciation of the facts needed to resolve Rule 
11 issues, additional inquiry will be unnecessary.213 The Fifth Cir-
cuit correspondingly stated that if a judge must resolve credibility 
questions or decide whether a good-faith legal argument can be as-
serted, some type of hearing often will be appropriate.214 
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the number of determi-
nations involving credibility that the district judge made in the ab-
sence of an evidentiary hearing should have suggested that such a 
proceeding would have been worthwhile.2111 Nonetheless, the panel 
found the trial court's participation in the litigation adequate to 
provide it full knowledge of the relevant facts without the need for 
an evidentiary hearing.216 The appellate court also decided that 
due process was satisfied, because the district judge afforded coun-
sel the opportunity to contest his determinations of Rule 11 viola-
tions through the submission of "voluminous written legal argu-
ments,'' affidavits, and thorough participation in oral argument.217 
The Fourth Circuit held, however, that the lawyers must have an 
opportunity to contest the type and amount of sanctions levied, 
especially given their large monetary nature.216 It therefore re-
conduct. See supra note 173. 
211 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 521. 
212 Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987); FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory 
committee's note. 
213 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 521 (citing Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1561 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11 
advisory committee's note)). The court in Donaldson observed that this situation often 
arises when the judge has ruled on the legal or factual merits of motions to dismiss or mo-
tions for summary judgment. 819 F.2d at 1561 n.13. 
m Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 521 (citing Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1561). 
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mantled the determinations to the trial court for reconsideration.210 
The Fourth Circuit found unpersuasive the precedent that the 
plaintiffs' counsel cited for the proposition that a hearing should 
be required when judges premise Rule 11 sanctions on bad faith or 
when issues of credibility are involved.220 The panel correspond-
ingly rejected the lawyers' contention that an evidentiary hearing 
was necessary in this lawsuit, even if not in all cases implicating 
the question of improper purpose. 221 
The court's due process analysis is problematic in several re-
spects. The panel unduly de-emphasized those cases stating that 
due process requires a hearing if a Rule 11 violation is predicated 
on bad faith or if issues of credibility are implicated. 222 Indeed, the 
Third Circuit recently suggested that a hearing should be held "to 
resolve disputes of material fact when the cold record may not dis-
close the full story. "223 Even the sources that the Fourth Circuit 
invoked, namely the Fifth Circuit case and the Advisory Commit-
tee Note, indicate that counsel for plaintiffs were due more process 
than they received in the instant case. 224 The notion that a trial 
court's participation in litigation could give it complete under-
standing of the pertinent facts is simply inapplicable, because the 
judge had no substantive involvement before the defendants 
sought sanctions, and he entered the Rule 11 proceeding with se-
verely limited knowledge of the lawsuit.2211 Finally, a hearing was 
needed to resolve many disputed issues of credibility raised by nu-
"" Id. 
220 Id. at 521 (citing Brown v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 173 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 206 (7th Cir. 1985); INVST Fin. 
Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391, 405 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 (1987)). 
The panel found the courts' reasoning scant. Id. 
221 
"(T]he findings are not clearly erroneous even excluding some evidence of 'improper 
motive' which appellants contested." Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522. 
222 See supra note 220 (citing these cases). See generally Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, 
at 14-16 (discussing these cases and court's failure to follow them). 
22
• Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1359 (3d Cir. 1990). "No precedent 
holds that a court may rule on a lawyer's motivation in filing a complaint without hearing 
testimony, permitting cross-examination and determining credibility when confronted with 
conflicting affidavits as to the facts." Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 16. 
22
• See supra notes 212-214 and· accompanying text (discussing these sources). See gener-
ally Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
22
• The original case was dismissed voluntarily little more than three months after its 
filing. The only action taken in that period was a plaintiff's motion for expedited discovery 
and defendant's motion for a protective order. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511-12. 
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merous assertions in the affidavits and papers submitted.226 
4. The Sanctions Imposed. 
939 
a. Additional Sanctions. The Fourth Circuit found improper the 
district judge's imposition of "additional sanctions" of $10,000 on 
each of the three lawyers for intentionally filing outrageous claims 
and publicizing them.227 The panel stated that Rule 11 does not 
reach all behavior within the judicial process and clearly does not 
encompass activity outside of that system. 228 
b. Attorney's Fees. The appellate court vacated the amount of 
the monetary sanction, finding that the trial judge had erred by 
invoking Rule 11 to compensate the defendants and to shift fees.229 
The Fourth Circuit instructed that the Rule should not be blindly 
employed as a fee-shifting device.230 The panel reiterated its view 
that judges should levy the "least severe sanction adequate to 
serve" the Rule's purposes, adding that Rule ll's principal objec-
tive is to "deter future litigation abuse" and that the amount of 
financial sanctions always should reflect this purpose.231 The court 
admonished trial judges to keep in mind Rule ll's other purposes, 
which include reimbursing victims of violations, punishing existing 
litigation abuse, streamlining litigation, and promoting court 
management.232 
The Fourth Circuit offered valuable guidance for district courts 
contemplating the imposition of monetary assessments. The panel 
22
• See supra text accompanying note 216 (discussing rationale for Fourth Circuit panel's 
contrary view). 
227 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525. 
22
• Id.; accord Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The rule does not 
purport to sanction conduct in the course of a lawsuit ••• that does not involve the signing 
of pleadings."); Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 620·22 (8th Cir. 1987) 
("Rule 11 is not the proper basis for sanctions against an attorney based on alleged misrep-
resentation in a settlement agreement."). 
22
• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522. 
23
• Id. (citing Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987)); accord Mars Steel Corp. 
v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11 is not a fee·shlfting 
device in the sense that the loser pays. It is a law imposing sanctions if counsel files with 
improper motives or inadequate investigation."). 
2
•
1 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523 (noting that district court must choose least severe sanction 
possible); id. at 522-23 ("[T]he primary •.. purpose of Rule 11 is ta deter future litigation 
abuse."); accord Cooter &·Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (noting deter-
rence function); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 871-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that court must impose least severe sanction necessary ta effectuate deterrence function). 
232 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522; accord Blue v. United States Dcp't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 
547 (4th Cir. 1990); White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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requested that trial judges clearly explain the reasons for the sanc-
tions they choose to levy, thereby facilitating appellate review of 
the propriety of awards. 233 The Fourth Circuit also suggested that 
lower courts consult four considerations that the Tenth Circuit re-
cently articulated in White v. General Motors Corp.234 The panel 
embellished those factors. 
The first consideration is the reasonableness of the attorney's 
fees that the moving party incurred. In White, the Tenth Circuit 
stated that calculating the amount of the litigant's reasonable ex-
penses generally is the initial step,2311 remarking that the injured 
party has a duty to mitigate its costs.236 In Kunstler, the Fourth 
Circuit provided guidance specific to this case, observing that the 
district judge should consider whether the movants failed to miti-
gate their expenses by invoking Rule 11 after dismissal and 
whether the substantial time the defendants devoted to pursuing 
sanctions was justified. 237 Recapitulating the least-severe-sanction 
concept, the panel stated that monetary awards should never be 
premised exclusively on the movant's attorney's fees and that "rea-
sonable fees" need not necessarily be actual ones.238 The appellate 
court held that "due process does not require an evidentiary hear-
ing" on reasonableness239 but that a trial court in its discretion 
may allow sanctioned parties to contest their opponents' fee state-
ments. 240 In support of its due process decision, the Fourth Circuit 
differentiated the purposes of Rule 11 sanctions from the shifting 
••• Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523; accord Thomas, 836 F.2d at 882-83; Brown v. Federation of 
State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1437-40'(7th Cir. 1987). 
••• 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1990). 
••• Id. at 684. In evaluating reasonableness, the judge should remember that the claim's 
frivolous nature is "what justifie[d] the sanction[]." Id. 
••• Id.; accord Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1092, 
1094 (3d Cir. 1988); Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878-81. 
237 Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523 ("Only attorney time which is in response to that which has 
been sanctioned should be evaluated."); accord White, 908 F.2d at 684. Judges should also 
consider whether the movants should have given earlier notice of the possible violation. 
Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523. 
••• Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523 (citing Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 
211 (4th Cir. 1988)); accord Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that reasonable fees need not be actual and citing Brown v. Federation of State Medical 
Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439-40 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
••• Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 524. 
••• Id. When the sanction is large and premised on movants' fee statements, violators 
should be allowed to evaluate and contest the charges to help the court in its decisionmak-
ing. Id. 
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of attorney's fees, which fee-shifting statutes prescribe, by observ-
ing that offenders have already had the opportunity to contest 
Rule violations and by recognizing the need to minimize the num-
ber of Rule 11 hearings.241 
The minimum amount reasonably needed to deter the conduct 
that contravened the Rule constitutes the second factor from 
White.242 The Fourth Circuit explained that trial judges must con-
stantly remember the restricted purpose of Rule 11 and that its 
enforcement should not chill the pursuit of facially legitimate liti-
gation or attorneys' creativity in introducing new legal theories.243 
The third consideration is the ability of offenders to pay the 
amount assessed. The Tenth Circuit in White analogized sanctions 
to punitive damages and inability to pay to an affirmative de-
fense.244 The Fourth Circuit in Kunstler stated that the imposition 
of monetary awards absent consideration of this factor would be an 
abuse of discretion, admonished judges to refrain from levying 
monetary assessments that would bankrupt violators or drive law-
yers out of practice,240 and advised that offenders who may be or-
dered to pay large monetary awards should be permitted to tender 
information on their financial status. 246 In the instant case, the 
panel instructed that the violators should have been allowed to 
241 Id. at 523-24. The court said that Rule 11 sanctions are not principally intended to 
compensate but to deter attorney and litigant misconduct, so offenders hnve less interest in 
contesting them than in disputing allegations that they violated the Rule in the first place. 
Id. at 524. In cases such as this one, however, the reputationo.I nnd resource interests of the 
sanctioned attorneys are substantial. 
242 White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1990); accord Doering 
v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1988); Eastway 
Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (revising award upward 
but stating sanction must be reasonably necessary to serve Rule ll's purpose), modified and 
remanded, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987). 
••• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524; accord Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th 
Cir. 1990); Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.), reh'g granted, 875 F.2d 
39 (2d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988). 
... White, 908 F.2d at 685. The offenders have the burden of bringing forward evidence of 
their financial status. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524. See generally Doering, 857 F.2d at 195-96 
(citing case authority on ability to pay) . 
... Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524; accord Doering, 857 F.2d at 195, 196; Tedeschi v. Smith 
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 579 F. Supp. 657, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd per curiam, 757 
F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985). 
"" Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524-25; accord Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 
F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). 
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show that the size of the sanctions would unfairly limit the attor-
neys' access to federal courts, restrict their ability to practice, or 
inflict "great financial distress."247 
A miscellany of considerations comprises the fourth factor. In 
White, the Tenth Circuit enumerated the offender's experience, 
history, and capability; the violation's severity; the degree of bad 
faith or malice implicated in the offense; the risk of chilling effects; 
and additional factors deemed proper in specific situations. 248 The 
Fourth Circuit found relevant counsel's substantial experience, the 
"scandalous and outrageous" character of the allegations they as-
serted, and the litigation's asserted improper purpose. 249 
The Fourth Circuit, in affording guidance on the amount of 
monetary sanctions to be imposed, evinced concern for the needs 
of civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. Certain aspects of its treat-
ment, however, remain less solicitous. For example, the panel un-
derstated the need for sanctioned parties to have an opportunity to 
contest financial awards.2110 Although the appellate court vacated 
the assessments levied, it remanded them for a "reasonableness" 
determination to the same district judge who had demonstrated 
considerable hostility toward counsel, as evidenced by the imposi-
tion of $30,000 in punitive, unauthorized sanctions absent any 
semblance of due process.2111 
In short, the Fourth Circuit opinion is deficient in many impor-
tant respects. The court uncritically adopted much of the trial 
judge's opinion, including the court's interpretation of Rule 11 and 
its application of the provision to the evidence.2112 Highly signifi-
cant was the panel's selective approach to appellate review. The 
court affirmed the trial judge's finding that counsel had violated 
247 Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524. 
248 White, 908 F.2d at 685; accord Doering, 857 F.2d at 196-97. The judge can also in-
crease sanctions for attorneys who previously have been sanctioned and sometimes must 
consider the propriety of joint and several liability. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525. 
••• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525. 
••• See supra note 241 (discussing panel's analysis of attorneys' various interests in avert-
ing sanctions). 
••• See supra text accompanying note 116 (discussing trial court's imposition of punitive 
attorney silnctions); cf. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525 (reversing trial court's award of $10,000 
against each lawyer). 
••• See supra notes 163-165, 181-193 and accompanying text (discussing specific trial 
court determinations that appellate court adopted). See generally Petition for Rehearing, 
supra note 184, at 1-2 (pointing out flaws in Fourth Circuit opinion). 
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the Rule in filing a "baseless" complaint, yet failed to set forth 
fairly the allegations in that complaint or to view generously the 
evidence adduced to support them. 2153 The panel considered the 
factual and legal premises for only two of six causes of action that 
plaintiffs pleaded; totally ignored their strongest claims; focused on 
unimportant, isolated factual mistakes in the complaint and on the 
plaintiffs' less significant legal claims; and narrowly interpreted the 
Claims, rejecting, for example, counsel's arguments for extending 
existing law.2154 The Fourth Circuit even seemed to test the plain-
tiffs' allegations by the erroneous standard of whether the claims 
would prevail rather than whether they were plausible and overem-
phasized the validity of the complaint rather than the reasonable-
ness of the inquiry that supported it.21515 
VI. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING To IN RE KuNSTLER 
A. PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC 
In October 1990, Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts filed petitions for 
rehearing and suggestions for hearing en banc.2156 On October 11, 
1990, the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions, which failed to re-
ceive the vote of a single member of the court.2157 The Fourth Cir-
cuit responded to the petition with unusual alacrity for a federal 
appeals court ostensibly inundated by the litigation explosion and 
••• This approach contrasts with the appellate review in Blue v. United States Dep't of 
Army, 914 F.2d 525, 540-41 (4th Cir. 1990). The panel in that case gave "plaintiffs' allega-
tions the generous reading" it believed they were due. Id. at 540. 
2M For instance, the plaintiffs' First and Sixth Amendment claims received little treat-
ment, the defendants' jurisdictional authority received great emphasis, and the exceptions 
to legal rules for which plaintiffs contended received little credence. Cf. Petition for Rehear-
ing, supra note 184, at 1-2 (arguing that appellate court's analysis conflicts with several 
Fourth Circuit opinions). 
••• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 514-18. The erroneous standard apparently violates Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990), which asks whether the claims were "rea-
sonable or plausible ••• under the circumstances." The Fourth Circuit in Blue, 914 F.2d at 
535-38, as in Kunstler, also overemphasized the merits and gave too little attention to the 
prefiling inquiry. 
2156 Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184 (Nakell's petition); Petition for Rehearing and 
Suggestion for Rehearing in Banc submitted on Behalf of William Kunstler, Kunstler (No. 
89-2815); Appellant Pitts' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing in Banc, 
Kunstler (No. 89-2815). 
207 In re Kunstler, No. 89-2815, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 22983 (4th Cir. OcL 11, 1990); 
Telephone Interview with Barry Nakell, appellant in Kunstler (Nov. 1, 1990); cf. Tobias, 
supra note 31, at 144 (noting intracircuit Rule 11 variation and infrequency of en bane 
hearings to foster consistency). 
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one apparently so overburdened that Congress created four new 
judgeships for it in the lOlst Congress. 2118 
B. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
In November 1990, Kunstler and Pitts filed separate petitions 
for writs of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and 
Nakell did so in January 1991.2119 On April 15, 1991, the Supreme 
Court denied the petitions, thus making the Fourth Circuit the 
lawyers' "court of last resort.11260 It appears unlikely, however, that 
counsel would have received more solicitous treatment from the 
Supreme Court. The Court has long expressed concern about the 
litigation explosion and has demonstrated increasing willingness to 
interpret procedural provisions in ways that frustrate attainment 
of congressional goals, such as reducing discrimination, in substan-
tive statutes-phenomena that the disastrous civil rights rulings of 
the Court's 1988 Term exemplify.261 The denial of certiorari 
meant, of course, that the three attorneys had the difficult task of 
persuading the very judge who imposed such large sanctions on 
them that he should exercise his discretion to levy a much smaller 
••• Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5098-99. 
••• As to Kunstler and Pitts, see Kunstler v. Britt, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990); 
Pitts v. Britt, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990); Pitts Petition, supra note 1; Kunstler 
Petition, supra note 6. As to Nakell, see Nakell v. Britt, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 8, 
1991); Nakell Petition, supra note 8. Julius Chanibers, who was sanctioned in Blue v. 
United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), also decided to appeal the 
Fourth Circuit decision. See Chanibers v. United States Dep't of Army, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1991); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Julius Chambers, Cham-
bers v. United States Dep't of Army, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. 1990) (No. 90-1076). 
••• Kunstler v. Britt, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Pitts v. Britt, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Nakell 
v. Britt, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). The Court also denied Julius Chanibers's petition in Blue. 
Chanibers v. United States Dep't of Army, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). Of course, all of the 
circuit courts have increasingly become courts of last resort because the Supreme Court 
grants so few petitions for certiorari. 
2
•
1 See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, The Reagan Court and Title VII: A 
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing apparent 
policies underlying recent Supreme Court Title VII cases and how decisions manifest these 
policies through use of procedure); Symposium, The United States Supreme Court's 1988 
Term Civil Rights Cases, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1341 (1990) (discussing Supreme Court's doctrines 
and decisions on discrimination); Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amend· 
ments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 993 (1991) (discussing use of amended 
Rules 11, 16, and 26 in civil rights and discrimination cases) [hereinafter Tobias, Judicial 
Discretion]; Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801 (1992) 
(discussing Supreme Court cases of 1988 Term and Civil Rights Act of 1991, which modified 
many of those cases) [hereinafter Tobias, Procedural Problems]. 
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award. Given the lack of solicitude for the lavzyers that the judge 
had already exhibited, his substantial discretion to choose the 
sanction, and the Fourth Circuit's guidance, it was unlikely that 
the district court would significantly reduce the assessment.262 
C. DISTRICT COURT OPINION ON REMAND 
On.August 30, 1991, the district court issued an opinion holding 
Kunstler, Nakell and Pitts jointly and severally liable for $50,000 
in sanctions. 263 The trial judge reiterated many of the instructions 
that the Fourth Circuit afforded for ascertaining an appropriate 
sanction; however, the district court failed to apply that guidance 
meaningfully. The trial judge essentially imposed the sanctions for 
compensatory purposes, generally seemed to misunderstand the 
appellate court's directions, and specifically contravened several 
explicit instructions. 
The trial judge initially summarized the Fourth Circuit's guid-
ance. The district court recognized that Rule ll's principal pur-
pose is the deterrence of future litigation abuse and that a judge is 
to impose the "least severe sanction adequate to serve the various 
purposes of Rule 11. "26' The district court then stated that other 
purposes of Rule 11, such as reimbursing victims of Rule 11 viola-
tions, controlling dockets, and punishing violations, should be con-
sidered in ascertaining appropriate sanctions.261l The judge ob-
served that when monetary sanctions are imposed, their amount 
"should always reflect the primary purpose of deterrence. "266 The 
trial court correspondingly stated that the Fourth Circuit required 
it to consider explicitly four factors in selecting a pecuniary sanc-
tion: "(l) The reasonableness of the opposing party's attorney's 
fees; (2) the minimum amount necessary to deter; (3) the ability to 
pay; and ( 4) the severity of the Rule 11 violation. "267 The judge 
262 The Fourth Circuit's guidance, although potentially solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs, 
remained general enough that it failed to cabin sufficiently the trial judge's considerable 
discretion to select the sanction. 
263 In re Kunstler, No. 89-06-CIV-3-H (E.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 1991) [hereinafter District 
Court Opinion II]. 
2 
.. Id. at 2 (citing In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 1607 (1991)). 
24
• Id. (citing Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522). 
266 Id. (quoting Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523). 
267 Id. (citing Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523). 
946 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:901 
added that monetary awards should be based upon these consider-
ations and should not be premised exclusively on the amount of 
attorney's fees that the movant has incurred. 268 
The trial court recognized that a broad array of sanctions was 
available and reiterated the idea that a judge must select the least 
severe sanction necessary to achieve the Rule's deterrent pur-
pose. 269 Nonetheless, the court determined that a monetary award 
was appropriate as the "minimum sanction adequate to deter fu-
ture Rule 11 violations,"270 offering little justification for that deci-
sion. The judge characterized counsel as experienced trial lawyers 
who were "well versed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rule 11" and who provide "legal services for public interest cli-
ents."271 The court also stated that the violation's character and 
the attorneys' persistence in claiming that there was no Rule 11 
violation required "more than a mere reprimand . . . to deter fu-
ture violations. "272 The judge, therefore, apparently premised his 
decision to impose monetary sanctions on counsel's failure to be 
sufficiently contrite. In short, the court a:ff orded virtually no sup-
port for its determination to levy a financial award. 
Once the district court found that monetary sanctions were ap-
propriate, it purportedly applied the four factors articulated by the 
Fourth Circuit.273 Nevertheless, the trial judge apparently ignored 
certain important facets of the appellate court's enunciation of 
those considerations, while diffidently applying numerous other 
aspects. 
The district court, in evaluating the initial factor, the reasona-
bleness of movant's attorney's fees, found that the fee requests 
submitted were accurate and justified but determined that they 
must be reduced by the amount spent in pursuing sanctions. 214 
Thus, while the defendants sought $93,000 in sanctions, the trial 
judge determined that the maximum amount that it could consider 
2
•• Id. (citing Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523). 
2
•• Id. at 3-4. 
210 Id. at 4. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
273 See supra text accompanying note 267 (listing these factors). 
274 District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 4-6; accord Brubaker v. City of Rich-
mond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1387 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 
914 F.2d 525, 548 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Litigants should be able to defend themselves from 
sanction without incurring additional sanctions."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). 
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reasonable as a :financial sanction was $59,000.2711 The district court 
simply neglected to apply the Fourth Circuit's instructions that it 
exclude from consideration in computing attorney's fees any time 
that lawyers spent defending unsanctioned claims276 and that it re-
duce the fees awarded because of defendants' failure to give earlier 
notice of potentially sanctionable conduct. 277 The trial judge ap-
parently failed to apply the appellate court's guidance directing 
him to consider whether the defendants neglected to mitigate their 
expenditures by filing a Rule 11 motion only after dismissal,278 al-
though the district court did mention this instruction.210 
The trial judge then tersely examined the second factor, the 
minimum amount necessary to deter.280 The court rejected the 
sanctioned attorneys' assertion that damage to their reputations 
and public embarrassment were sufficient sanctions and accused 
counsel of refusing to help it ascertain a monetary amount consis-
tent with the Rule's deterrent purpose.281 The judge, accordingly, 
premised the determination that a substantial pecuniary sanction 
was necessary on his own analysis of the lawyers' behavior and 
their reactions to the sanctions motion.282 The court found that 
"more than a nominal amount or 'token' award" was warranted to 
guarantee that the attorneys would not file meritless litigation in 
the future. 283 The district judge failed to make any individualized 
determination of the least severe sanction necessary to deter.284 
The court did not conduct this inquiry, even though Nakell 
presented the court with a wealth of evidence that substantially 
supported the imposition of a nonmonetary sanction or a signifi-
cantly smaller financial award.2811 
27
• District Court Opinion Il, supra note 263, at 4-6. 
278 See id.; see also In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 1607 (1991). 
277 See District Court Opinion Il, supra note 263, at 4-6; see also Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 
523. 
278 See District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 4-6; see also Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 
523. 
27
• District Court Opinion Il, supra note 263, at 5. 
280 Id. at 6-7. 
281 See id. at 7. 
292 Id. 




• Nakell presented evidence, for example, of his reputation for honesty, ethical propri-
ety, and public service and of the profound impact that the sanctions already imposed had 
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The trial judge next considered the third factor, ability to pay.286 
Although Pitts had submitted much evidence relating to this con-
sideration, the court summarily concluded that the magnitude of 
the sanction selected was insufficiently large to bankrupt the attor-
neys or force them to quit practicing. 287 The judge apparently at-
tempted to justify the cryptic treatment of ability to pay and the 
lack of consideration that he accorded to each individual lawyer's 
capacity. The court observed that the imposition of joint and sev-
eral liability meant that Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts could formu-
late their own contribution system for paying the sanction, flip-
pantly remarking that counsel clearly coordinated commencement 
of the litigation that led to sanctioning and that they could pursue 
a similar approach in paying the assessment. 288 
The district court finally turned to the fourth factor, which com-
prises a miscellany of considerations that the Fourth Circuit ar-
ticulated. 289 The judge examined only two of the considerations 
and employed them essentially to substantiate the large amount of 
the sanction levied. 29° First, the court derived the proposition that 
counsel's violation of Rule 11 was intentional from the attorneys' 
expertise as experienced trial lawyers. 291 Second, the judge stated 
that the lawyers contravened all three parts of Rule 11, character-
izing "[s]uch an extensive violation [as] egregious," and found that 
their behavior amply supported a strong sanction.292 The court, 
however, failed to mention two critical considerations espoused by 
the Fourth Circuit-the offender's history and the danger of chil-
ling the kind of litigation implicated.293 The application of these 
considerations should have led the judge to levy a much smaller 
sanction. For example, Nakell offered substantial evidence of his 
exemplary record of legal representation, especially for resource-
poor individuals, such as Native Americans in Robeson County 
had on him. Brief of Appellant Barry Nakell at 9-13, In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 
1990) (No. 91-2267), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991) [hereinafter Brief of Nakell]. 
288 District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 7. 
281 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 7-8; see also Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 524-25. 
29
• District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 7-8. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 See supra text accompanying note 290 (noting that judge considered only two of many 
factors). 
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and incarcerated persons.29' Correspondingly, when civil rights at-
torneys learn that their ablest colleagues, lawyers such as Julius 
Chambers, William Kunstler, and Barry Nakell, have received 
large sanctions, this chills the enthusiasm of all civil rights 
practitioners. 295 
The court summarized its failure to accord individualized con-
sideration to Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts by holding that all three 
attorneys must be held jointly and severally liable.296 The judge 
flatly refused to make any distinction among the lawyers, treating 
them equally, because he considered their violations to be identi-
cal.297 The district court concluded its opinion by imposing joint 
and several liability on Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts in the amount 
of $50,000.298 The judge also prohibited all three attorneys from 
appearing in or practicing before the Eastern District of North 
Carolina until they paid the sanction. 299 
D. FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINION ON APPEAL OF RE!\L\ND 
In October 1991, Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts filed notices of ap-
peal of the determination on remand to the trial court. 300 Briefing 
occurred in early 1992, and oral argument was conducted on May 
4, 1992.301 On July 2, the Fourth Circuit issued a per curiam, un-
published opinion in which it very deferentially reviewed the sanc-
tions determination of the district judge.302 
The panel initially dis.agreed with appellants' contention that 
the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions would have satisfied Rule 
ll's purposes.303 The court stated that the trial judge considered 
2 
.. Brief of Nakell, supra note 285, at 12·13. 
29
• See Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546·51 (4th Cir. 1990) (af-
firming imposition of substantial sanction on Julius Chambers, Director-Counsel of NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). See generally Stephen Labaton, 
Solution to Wasteful Lawsuits Becomes a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, nt E2. 
29
• District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 8. 
291 Id. 
29
• Id. at 9. 
299 Id. This ruling meant that Nakell would have to pay the entire amount to practice in 
the court, were Kunstler and Pitts not to contribute. Brief of Nakell, supra note 285, at 9 
n.l. 
300 Brief of Nakell, supra note 285, at 1. 
301 Telephone Interview with Barry Nakell, Professor of Law, Unh·ersity of North Caro-
lina (June 18, 1992). 
•
0
• In re Pitts, No. 91-2265, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 (4th Cir. July 2, 1992). 
303 Id. at *3. 
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nonfinancial sanctions but determined that the circumstances of 
the lawsuit required that he levy a monetary award to deter future 
abuse of the litigation process.304 The Fourth Circuit observed that 
such a decision was within the district judge's discretion and found 
no abuse in the ruling. 3011 
The panel then examined appellants' argument that the size of 
the monetary sanctions imposed was excessive. The court reiter-
ated the four factors that it had instructed the district judge to 
take into account when ascertaining the amount of the assess-
. ment. 306 The Fourth Circuit traced tlie trial judge's calculations. 307 
It stated that he began with $93,000 in fees and expenses that de-
fendants claimed, reduced that by the amount spent on pursuit of 
sanctions, and determined that the remaining fees and costs of 
$59,000 were reasonable.308 The panel stated that the district judge 
imposed sanctions of $50,000 after considering the other three fac-
tors-"appellants' ability to pay, the minimum necessary to deter, 
and the severity of the violation."309 
The Fourth Circuit essentially agreed with appellants' conten-
tion that the lack of itemization made it impossible to discern 
whether expenses sought by defendants for time spent by SBI 
agents and paralegals were devoted to pursuing Rule 11 sanc-
tions. 310 The court expressed concern about the "lack of specific-
ity" in affidavits substantiating these costs and disallowed them, 
remarking that the trial judge might have had this generality in 
mind when reducing the sanctions calculation from $59,000 to 
$50,000. 311 
The court decided that careful review of the briefs, the record, 
and oral arguments revealed that the rest of appellants' challenges 
lacked merit. 312 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district 
judge acted within his discretion when levying sanctions but re-
duced the judgment to $43,325, subtracting the amount allowed for 
30
' Id. at *3-4. 
•
0
• Id. at *4. 
3o• Id. 
307 Id. at *5. 
30s Id. 
300 Id. 
310 Id. at *5. 
011 Id. 
312 Id. at *6. 
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expenses of SBI agents and paralegals. 313 
VII. ADDITIONAL NATIONAL AND FOURTH CmcuIT JURISPRUDENCE 
THAT DISADVANTAGES CIVIL RIGHTS PLAINTIFFS AND LAWYERS 
As troubling as the ruling in In re Kunstler is for civil rights 
plaintiffs and attorneys, the opinion might be somewhat less prob-
lematic were it not part of broader developments in the Fourth 
Circuit and nationwide. 314 The Supreme Court and many lower 
federal courts have applied substantive and procedural provisions 
of civil rights legislation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in ways that disadvantage, and even disproportionately affect, civil 
rights plaintiffs and their counsel. 3111 These developments need not 
be comprehensively chronicled here, for that task has been under-
taken elsewhere.316 Several examples, however, suffice to demon-
strate that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. 
In the 1988 Term, the Supreme Court interpreted substantive 
and procedural language of numerous civil rights statutes in ways 
that complicate the efforts of civil rights plaintiffs to vindicate 
their rights. 317 The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's finding that 
a racial harassment claim was not cognizable under Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union,316 one of the major civil rights cases of that 
.,. Id. 
••• See generally Tobias, supra note 15; Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261. 
.,. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 296-335 (arguing that Federal Rules o.s applied adversely 
affect civil rights plaintiffs); Phyllis T. Baumann, et al., Substance in the Shadow of Proc~ 
dure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. 
REv. 211 (1992) (arguing that procedures as applied adversely affect employment discrimi-
nation plaintiffs); Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261, at 811-13 (analyzing Civil 
Rights Act of 1991). 
••• See, e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 261 (analyzing employment discrimination 
cases of 1988 Term of Supreme Court); Tobias, supra note 15, at 296-335 (discussing judi-
cial application of Rules 8, 11, 19, 24(a)(2), 68, and others and recognizing pattern of ad-
verse application of these rules to civil rights plaintiffs); Overview: Civil Rights in the 
1990s-Title VII and Employment Discrimination, 8 YALE L. & PoL'Y RE\•. 197, 197-379 
(1990) (discussing in series of articles issues and policy choices in employment discrimina-
tion after 1988 Term). 
017 See generally Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261, at 811-13; Sandro Hemer-
yck et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Reponse: The 1988 
Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 475 
(1990) (recounting history of civil rights legislation and Supreme Court. enforcement thereof 
and examining legislative responses to Court's decisions). 
318 491 U.S. 164, 178 (1989), aff'g in part, vacating in part, and remanding 805 F.2d 1143 
(4th Cir. 1986). 
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Term. All of the circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, now de-
mand that the plaintiffs plead with particularity under Rule 8. 319 
Typical of the circuit's jurisprudence is a recent determination 
that affirmed a lower court's decision to read Rule 68 in conjunc-
tion with the fee-shifting provision of Title VII in a manner that 
severely restricts plaintiffs' ability to recover fees, thus potentially 
limiting the number of attorneys who are willing to take civil rights 
cases.320 
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE KUNSTLER 
The Fourth Circuit litigation involving Rule 11 could have many 
deleterious consequences. For the Native American and African 
American residents of Robeson County who have little political 
power and few economic resources, it represents the loss of one 
important opportunity to increase their strength in a community 
where they have experienced discrimination and to limit alleged 
corruption among local officials. Insofar as these individuals, and 
others similarly situated, rely on federal civil rights litigation to 
reduce discrimination and to enhance their political, economic, and 
social opportunities, both courts' unsolicitous treatment of the par-
ties and their lawyers in In re Kunstler discourages them. The 
Fourth Circuit and the district court have correspondingly compro-
mised the exercise of fundamental First Amendment rights of free 
speech and freedom of association and assembly and perhaps per-
mitted the chilling of a legitimate form of protest in Robeson 
County. 
••• See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 & n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing authority 
from all circuits), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Wetherington v. Phillips, 526 F.2d 591 
(4th Cir. 1975); cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination, 
954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2989 (1992) (indication that Supreme 
Court may resolve issue). See generally Tobias, supra note 15, at 296-301 (discussing federal 
judicial application of Rule 8 in public law litigation). For analysis of the application of 
numerous additional Rules, see id. at 301-35 (discussing Rules 11, 68, 19, and 24(a)(2)). 
•
20 Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 662-64 (4th Cir. 1990). Rule 68 governs 
settlement offers. The Rule states, "If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not 
more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of 
the offer." FED. R. C1v. P. 68. Spencer purports to follow Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), 
which interpreted Rule 68 governing settlement offers in conjunction with the Civil Rights 
Attorneys Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See generally Thomas P. Rowe, Jr. & 
Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Autumn 1988) (reporting on study results of offers to settle in civil 
litigation). 
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The trial judge's vigorous application of Rule 11 and the appel-
late court's failure to scrutinize such enforcement may effectively 
mean that the pursuit of civil rights cases in certain federal district 
courts has for all practical purposes been foreclosed.321 The panel's 
lack of concern for vindication of essential First and Sixth Amend-
ment rights as well as statutory civil rights is disheartening, be-
cause the Fourth Circuit is, in nearly all cases, the court of last 
resort in a region that has a long, troubled history of denying polit-
ical and economic power to racial minorities. 322 The threat that 
some district judges, who are unsympathetic and even hostile to 
civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, will zealously enforce Rule 11 
and that circuit courts will deferentially review such application, in 
conjunction with other detrimental developments, such as the Su-
preme Court's civil rights opinions of the 1988 Term, will addition-
ally diminish the already small pool of lawyers who are willing to 
321 The Kunstler and Blue litigation could discourage potential civil rights plaintiffs and 
counsel who might represent them from pursuing litigation in the Eastern District or North 
Carolina. Data assembled in five federal districts having computerized dockets show that 
civil rights plaintiffs are more likely to be sanctioned than litigants who pursue a number or 
other types of cases. See FJC REPORT, supra note 34, § lC (summarizing Rule 11 sanctions 
in civil rights cases from five federal district courts). 
322 Much school desegregation and voting rights litigation arose out or the Fourth Circuit. 
For example, the Supreme Court consolidated cases from the Eastern District or South Car-
olina and the Eastern District of Virginia with Brown v. Board or Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). One of the leading voting rights cases held Virginia's poll tax unconstitutional. 
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The trial court had upheld 
the use of the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in state and local elections. Harper v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 240 F. Supp. 270, 271 (E.D. Va. 1964), reu'd, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966). In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the Virginia Supreme Court case of Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966), 
reu'd, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which had upheld a conviction tmder a state statute prohibiting 
- interracial marriages between Whites and African Americans. Id. at 82. In NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Supreme Court struck down the application or Virginia laws, 
which defined as malpractice the actions of attorneys who joined suits without having a 
personal stake, such as the NAACP joining in racial discrimination suits. In Button, the 
Court reversed the Virginia Supreme Court case of NAACP v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 
1960), reu'd sub nom. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The Virginia court had af-
firmed in part and reversed in part a declaratory judgment against the NAACP. The Vir-
ginia court had held that a state statute that provided for disbarment of attorneys who 
accepted employment from an organization acting as agent for another person, but which 
itself had no pecuniary right or liability, was constitutional. Id. at 64-69. The Virginia Court 
also had struck down a statute that made it unlawful for any person not having a direct 
interest in the suit to offer money or anything of value to another to induce that person to 
commence a suit. Id. at 69-72. 
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pursue civil rights cases aggressively.~23 Moreover, these problems 
could sharply curtail the representation of unpopular persons or 
causes as well as the filing and vigorous pursuit of highly political 
or controversial lawsuits, such as those seeking to challenge the 
questionable exercise of governmental authority. 
The Kunstler case has serious professional and personal conse-
quences for attorneys like Barry Nakell and Lewis Pitts, who take 
on these types of cases, causes, and clients in an effort to improve 
the quality of justice for all citizens. It is difficult to estimate the 
impact in the legal community and the broader society of having 
the appeals court besmirch one's reputation and impugn one's in-
tegrity in the pages of the Federal Reporter. This treatment ig-
nores the enormous monetary, temporal, and emotional expendi-
tures that these two attorneys and William Kunstler have devoted 
to defending their reputations and their resources. Even if the en-
tire monetary sanction had been removed, Nakell might have 
ceased pursuing cases like Bounds v. Smith,324 which convinced the 
Supreme Court to create new rights for incarcerated individuals, 
who are the least powerful members of society. Perhaps Nakell will 
quit the practice altogether, a course of action that Rule 11 has 
forced some lawyers to consider and a few to follow. 3211 
323 For a discussion of developments that have additionally diminished the small pool of 
civil rights attorneys, see Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 743-59 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. l, 15-32 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For discussion of 
the Reagan Administration's federal judicial appointments and their lack of solicitude for 
civil rights plaintiffs, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal 
Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191-98 (1988). Cf. Carl Tobias, More Women 
Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L .. REV. 477, 480 (1991) (expressing similar ideas regarding 
Bush Administration appointees); Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261, at 811-13 
(noting that Congress passed Civil Rights Act of 1991 after bitter fight, but legislation did 
not treat numerous procedural obstacles that civil rights plaintiffs confront). 
32
• 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Bounds reaffirmed the requirement that prison officials provide 
prisoners with law libraries and legal assistance. Id. 
3
•• See Labaton, supra note 295, at E2 (noting that some lawyers left practice because of 
Rule 11 sanctions); George Cochran, Professor of Law, University of Mississippi, and 
Charles Presto, Esq., Atlanta, Ga., Statements at New York University Rule 11 Conference 
(Nov. 2-3, 1990) (same); cf. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990) ("A court 
should refrain from imposing a monetary award so great that it will bankrupt the offending 
parties or force them from the future practice of law."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); 
see also supra text accompanying note 245 (discussing Kunstler court's assertion that dis-
trict judges should refrain from levying sanctions that would drive attorneys out of 
practice). 
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IX. RECONSIDERING RULE 11 
As disadvantageous as In re Kunstler could be for the vindica-
tion of civil rights in the Fourth Circuit and nationally, the litiga-
tion will have served a valuable purpose if it persuades those re-
sponsible for changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that 
fundamental revision of Rule 11 must now be seriously considered. 
On November 1, 1990, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules 
received written public comments on Rule ll's operation. An over-
whelming number of those comments criticized the Rule, and 
many who commented called for its repeal or substantial 
amendment. 326 
Numerous witnesses offered similar observations at a February 
1991 public hearing held in New Orleans.327 That testimony and 
the preliminary :findings of a Federal Judicial Center study of Rule 
11, which the Advisory Committee commissioned, apparently 
prompted the Committee to conclude that some revision was war-
ranted. 326 Most Committee members seemed to believe that addi-
tional amendment was necessary, while a few apparently consid-
ered the perception that Rule 11 was chilling litigants and lawyers 
to be sufficient justification.329 The Judicial Center's tentative de-
terminations that civil rights plaintiffs were more likely than cer-
tain other litigants to be sanctioned in numerous federal districts 
led the Advisory Committee to ask for refinement of the data.330 
32
• Telephone Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal Judi-
cial Center (Nov. 15, 1990). This also is my assessment after reviewing many of the com-
ments submitted. 
327 Telephone Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal Judi-
cial Center (Feb. 26, 1991); Telephone Interview with Melissa Nelken, Professor, Hastings 
College of the Law (Feb. 26, 1991); Telephone Interview with Georgene Vairo, Professor, 
Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 26, 1991). Professors Nelken and Vairo testified at 
the February hearing. 
328 See supra note 327 and accompanying text (discussing testimony); FED&RAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RULE 11 (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter PRELJMINARY RE-
PORT]. The Judicial Center also found that approximately 803 or the federal district judges 
favor retaining Rule 11 intact, even though a similar number believe that the Rule does not 
prevent litigation abuse. Moreover, monetary assessments remain the "sanction of choice" 
for violations of Rule 11. See Executive Summary in PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra. 
•
2
• These ideas are gleaned from the telephone conversations, supra note 327, and from 
what the Committee members actually said about possible revision at the oral hearing. 
330 See supra note 321 (citing Judicial Center data); telephone interviews, supra note 327 
(noting Committee request that data be refined); cf. Marshall, et al., supra note 38, at 965-
73 (noting that civil rights plaintiffs are more likely to be sanctioned than nearly all other 
litigants). 
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At the regularly-scheduled Advisory Committee meeting, which 
was held in late May of 1991, the Committee proposed revisions in 
Rule 11 that were circulated for public comment in August 1991.331 
One significant change was the Committee's imposition of a "con-
tinuing duty," which would require lawyers and prose litigants to 
withdraw almost any portion of a paper when it becomes untena-
ble. 332 The Committee also prescribed "safe harbors," which would 
require that parties provide alleged violators notice and opportu-
nity to withdraw deficient claims before the parties file Rule 11 
motions.333 The proposed Advisory Committee note that would ac-
company the proposed Rule also affords judges increased flexibility 
in punish.ing violations, admonishing them to reduce the use of at-
torney's fees as sanctions. 334 Public comment on the proposal, 
which was due in February 1992, was nearly as critical as that sub-
mitted in November 1990.3311 
In mid-June 1992, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee) approved many 
of the recommendations that the Advisory Committee had for-
warded and included several significant changes of its own. 336 The 
most important modification that the Standing Committee made 
was the suggested reversion to the discretionary imposition of 
sanctions once Rule violations have been found. 337 The Committee 
331 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 74-82 (1991) 
[hereinafter FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (Proposed Draft)]. See generally Carl Tobias, Reconsidering 
Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1992) (analyzing Rule 11 proposal). 
332 FED. R. C1v. P. ll(b) (Proposed Draft), supra note 331, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 75. 
See generally Tobias, supra note 331, at 866-70. 
333 FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c)(l)(A) (Proposed Draft), supra note 331, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 
at 76. See generally Tobias, supra note 331, at 875-79. 
334 See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (Proposed Draft), supra note 331, advisory committee's note, 
reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 78-80. See generally Tobias, supra note 331, at 880-87. 
3
•• This conclusion is premised on my review of numerous comments and discussions with 
a number of commentators. See also supra note 330 and accompanying text (addressing 
November comment). 
336 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 43 (July 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter PROPOSAL]. 
The Advisory Committee made numerous changes in its May 1991 draft before sending it to 
the Supreme Court. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of 
Rule 11, 77 lowA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992). 
337 See PROPOSAL, supra note 336, at 46 (Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c)) ("[T]he court 
1992] CIVIL RIGHTS CONUNDRUM 957 
correspondingly agreed to include in the committee note the ideas 
that monetary sanctions "should ordinarily be paid into court as a 
penalty" and should be paid to those injured by violations only in 
"unusual circumstances."338 The Committee also decided to limit 
the continuing-duty concept.339 
In September, the Judicial Conference approved the proposal 
that the Standing Committee tendered and submitted the proposal 
to the Supreme Court. 340 The Court in turn must forward its rec-
ommendation to Congress before May 1, 1993, and that proposal 
will become effective 210 days thereafter, unless Congress alters 
it.341 
In re Kunstler vividly demonstrates the advisability of the type 
of amendment now under consideration. The case and other Rule 
11 litigation illustrate that the Supreme Court and Congress 
should repeal or revise the provision expeditiously. If the Supreme 
Court does not make additional changes solicitous of civil rights 
plaintiffs, Congress may want to intercede, if only to prevent addi-
tional erosion of the substantive civil rights legislation that it has 
passed.342 Without additional amendment of Rule 11, its enforce-
ment could continue to discourage individuals and attorneys who 
pursue civil rights cases in objective good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judicial Conference's recent indication that it will propose 
may . . . impose an appropriate sanction ...• " (emphasis added)); see also Randall 
Samborn, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule II, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1992, at 13 (discussing this 
proposal). The pre-1983 version of Rule 11 was discretionary. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, reprinted in 
97 F.R.D. 196, 197 (1983). 
338 Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 11 proposed advisory committee note, PROPOSAL, supra note 
336, at 53-54; see also supra text accompanying note 334. 
33
• See Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. ll(b), PROPOSAL, supra note 336, at 45; see also Proposed 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 proposed advisory committee note, PROPOSAL, supra note 336, at 53·54. 
••
0 Marianne Lavell, The Judicial Conference Would Alter Rule 11, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 5, 
1992, at 5. See generally Lewis, supra note 20 (discussing rules revision process); Mullenix, 
supra note 134 (same). 
30 Samborn, supra note 337; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (Supp. 1992) (requiring submis-
sion of proposed rule to Congress and establishing effective date). Each entity in the rule 
revision hierarchy typically evinces increasing deference to the judgment of those below iL 
... See Tobias, supra note 336, § ill (suggesting additional refinement. in Rule 11 propo-
sal); see also Tobias, Judicial Discretion, supra note 261, at 961 (discussing general congres-
sional reluctance to intercede in rule revision); supra note 323 (discussing judicial and legis-
lative failure to treat procedural problems in civil rights cases). 
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rev1s1on of Rule 11 affords considerable promise of change for 
those civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers who have been the victims 
of nearly nine years of experimentation with Rule 11. Repeal or 
substantial amendment will help parties and attorneys who seek to 
reduce discrimination by vindicating rights in the federal courts. 
Revision of Rule 11 would be an ·advance, albeit a modest one, es-
pecially for Native Americans and African Americans like residents 
of Robeson County who band together to combat discrimination, 
poverty, and alleged official misconduct. 
More than four years after Eddie Hatcher and Timothy Jacobs 
broke into The Robesonian,343 and nearly three years after both 
men completely paid any debt that they owed society, there has 
been little change in Robeson County.344 Numerous Native-Ameri-
can and African-American residents of Robeson County still are 
attempting to exercise their First Amendment rights and to attain 
a measure of political and economic power, even as many continue 
to encounter discrimination and governmental intimidation. Alle-
gations of official misconduct remain rampant, while there is ap-
parently considerable drug trafficking. 
As Barry Nakell prepares for another semester of teaching law 
students about the justice system, he must confront the unhappy 
prospect of knowing that he will never be completely vindicated. 
Perhaps Nakell will discontinue his quiet, but forceful, work to 
achieve social justice for all North Carolinians. William Kunstler 
has defiantly proclaimed: "I'm not going to pay any fine . . . . I'm 
going to rot in jail if that's what I have to do to dramatize this 
thing."3411 The ultimate irony, of course, is that years after the 
events that led to the Rule 11 proceeding, and even some time af-
ter the Rule is ultimately revised, certain litigants and lawyers, 
who seek to vindicate fundamental constitutional and civil rights, 
will continue to experience the chilling effects of the 1983 amend-
ment to Rule 11. 
343 See supra text accompanying note 6 (describing this event). 
••• See supra text accompanying notes 78, 80 (describing termination of Jacobs's criminal 
suit and of civil litigation on behalf of Hatcher and Jacobs). 
••• Don J. DeBenedictis, Rule 11 Snags Lawyers, 77 AB.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 16, 17. 
